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ABSTRACT 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 
Yalım, Derya 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı 
September 2003  
 
 
Decentralization has become an important policy issue in recent years. 
International organizations allocate more space for fiscal decentralization in their 
agenda. In the literature, there are vast amount of studies that concentrate on the 
advantages or disadvantages of fiscal decentralization. The literature suggested 
that with a good policy design of the fiscal decentralization, especially 
developing countries might achieve desired outcomes. In contrast, poorly 
designed fiscal decentralization may lead to a variety of undesirable outcomes, 
such as macroeconomic imbalances, low growth and corruption. In this study, 
using a panel data of up to fifty-nine countries and year’s range 1972 to 2000, we 
empirically investigate whether there is any evidence for the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on inflation, budget deficits and growth. The general conclusion 
of our empirical work is that developing countries may reduce inflation with 
enhancement of fiscal decentralization, provided that the size of government 
expenditures is not large. But our results are not robust for budget deficit and 
growth. Besides, the association of fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic 
performance indicators is not statistically significant in developed countries.  
 
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, inflation, budget deficits and growth 
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ÖZET 
 
MALİ YERELLEŞME VE MAKRO İKTİSADİ 
PERFORMANSA ETKİLERİ 
 
Yalım, Derya 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü  
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı 
Eylül, 2003 
 
 
Son yıllarda, yerelleşme önemli bir sosyal politika haline geldi. 
Uluslararası kuruluşlar mali yerelleşmeyi gündemlerine daha fazla almaya 
başladılar. Literatürde, mali yerelleşmenin avantajlarından ya da 
dezavantajlarından bahseden pek çok çalışma bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmalar, mali 
yerelleşme politikasının iyi düzenlenmesi ile özellikle gelişmekte olan ülkelerin 
istenen sonuçları elde edebileceklerini belirtiyor. Kötü düzenlenen mali 
yerelleşme ise makro iktisadi dengesizlikler, düşük büyüme ve yolsuzluklar gibi 
istenmeyen sonuçlara yol açabilir. Elli dokuz ülkenin, 1972’den 2000’e kadar 
bilgilerini içine alan panel veri kümesi kullanarak, mali yerelleşmenin enflasyon, 
bütçe açığı ve büyüme üzerindeki etkilerini yakalamaya çalıştık. Çalışmamızın 
önemli bulguları şunlardır: Gelişmekte olan ülkeler, kamu harcamalarının büyük 
olmaması halinde, mali yerelleşme ile enflasyonu düşürebilirler. Ancak, mali 
yerelleşmenin bütçe açığı ve büyüme üzerindeki etkisine ait sonuçlar 
enflasyondaki kadar kuvvetli değildir. Bunun yanında, gelişmiş ülkeler için, mali 
yerelleşme ile makro iktisadi performans göstergelerinin ilişkisi istatistiki olarak 
anlamlı değildir.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: mali yerelleşme, enflasyon, bütçe açığı ve büyüme 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1970s, trend towards decentralization has not been noteworthy but its 
implications have continuously been debated. Some countries around the world have 
embarked on decentralization (Treisman, 2000). Essentially, international 
organizations recommend decentralization to developing nations in order to dispose 
of their problems such as the challenge of ethno-geographic diversity, the challenge 
of transition to market economy, the need for the enhancement of democratisation, 
and the need to improve delivery of local services. Many countries in Latin America, 
Africa, East Europe and South Asia have started decentralization programs within 
the past decade  (Litvack et al., 1998). Besides, developed countries, as well, have 
been in an attempt to find proper level of fiscal balance between central and 
subnational governments (Bahl, 1995). 
Decentralization is the transfer of authority and responsibility for public 
functions from the central government to intermediate and local governments or 
quasi-independent government organizations and/or private sector (Litvack and 
Seddon, 1999). Types of decentralization comprise of fiscal, political, administrative 
and market decentralization. For performing the decentralized functions of central 
government, local governments should have an adequate level of revenues and, in 
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addition, the authority to make assessment about expenditures. Therefore, fiscal 
decentralization is a core component of decentralization.  
In the literature, there are vast amount of studies that concentre on the 
benefits of fiscal decentralization. The benefits of decentralization can be based on 
two primary reasons: efficiency argument and revenue mobilization argument. 
Efficiency argument depends on, especially, allocative efficiency. Firstly, central 
governments can only supply goods and services in uniform quantities and qualities 
over their territory. Decentralization permits non-uniform provisions that better 
match the preferences of citizens (Oates, 1972). Taking account of local differences 
in culture, environment, preferences and needs, endowment of natural resources, and 
economic and social institutions can boost the performance of the public sector. 
Since local governments are closer to the people, they are generally better informed 
about the needs and preferences of local population than central government, which 
has limited capacity to collect information. By shortening the informational distance 
between the providers and recipients of public goods and services, information costs 
can be reduced and scarce public resources can be channelled into more productive, 
externality-generating uses nationwide, thus public sector efficiency in service 
delivery can be enhanced (Hutter and Shah, 1998; Oates, 1972 and 1999, İnman and 
Rubinfeld, 1996). 
Besides, theoretically, monitoring and control of local agents by local 
communities is easier. Decentralization can strengthen accountability as it increases 
the proximity between representatives and the electorate. Central government 
representatives do not necessarily need to be elected in all subnational jurisdictions, 
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whereas each local representative has to win the election in his/her own jurisdiction. 
Subnational governments may therefore be more accountable to their electorate than 
the central government (Seabright, 1996). The closer association between 
expenditures and revenue recruitment at the subnational level may lead to better 
accountability of government actions (Bahl, 1999; Oates, 1999).  Elected local 
governments may generally be responsive to poor people, and better at involving the 
poor in political processes. Successful decentralization may improve the efficiency 
and responsiveness of the public sector to the needs of poor. Additionally, 
competition of the autonomous jurisdictions may lead to a reduction in bribes, and, 
accordingly, corruption may also be reduced in decentralized governments 
(Weingast, 1995; Treisman, 2000).   
Moreover, decentralization is a means of initiating more participation into 
the democratic process. By decentralizing the delivery of public services, local 
residents would have the perception that, through voting, they determine the 
direction of local service delivery. Local taxpayers also become more keenly aware 
of the connection between the payment of taxes and the delivery of local services 
and thus learn fiscal responsibility and will be more willing to pay for public 
services, given that their preferences will be honoured (Wasylenko, 2001). 
Lastly, a decentralized system can reduce mobility and organizational cost, 
which is required for the achievement of optimal assignment of powers (Breton and 
Scott, 1978). Organizational costs include the cost of signalling preferences, the cost 
of moving between jurisdictions, the cost of coordinating intergovernmental affairs, 
and the cost of administration of governmental bodies. Decentralization, leads to that 
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outcome, as it supports intergovernmental competition that, in turn, force politicians 
and public sector bureaucrats to do what is required to make organizational costs as 
small as possible or, equivalently, to supply goods and services in quantities and in 
qualities desired by citizens (Breton, 1996).   
Decentralization can boost revenue mobilization, as some taxes such as the 
property tax and other land based tax, are best suited to local government in that 
their evaluation and collection requires familiarity with the local economy and 
population (Bahl, 1995). The other reason is that, taxes are perceived as quasi-
benefit charges, which finance local services. Generally, however, the central 
governments are unable to reach all enterprises and taxpayers with value added and 
income tax. On the other hand, local governments might be able to capture the 
unused fiscal capacity, originating from income tax excused of small enterprises and 
workers outside the formal sector. 
The recent literature illustrates, however, that decentralization is not a magic 
potion, particularly in developing and transition economies. First of all, in the 
absence of a mechanism to transfer resources between districts, an increase in 
regional disparities is one of the problems that are associated with decentralization 
since wealthier urban governments will benefit most from greater local taxing 
powers. In addition, administrative responsibilities may be transferred to local levels 
without adequate financial resources, making equitable distribution or provision of 
services more difficult. Centralization allows the national government more 
discretion in determining regional differences in levels of public service and taxation 
(Robalino et al., 2001; Bahl, 1995). Secondly, the potential for increased efficiency 
 5 
in the provision of local public may not be fulfilled, if institutional capacity is weak 
at the subnational level. It is also arguable that in an environment with proximity of 
individuals and local government, corruption may be enhanced (Prud’homme, 1995; 
Tanzi, 1995).  Also, weak budget oversight and poor governance may also breed 
corruption and encourage rent seeking on the part of the local elite and civil service. 
Moreover, decentralization may not always be efficient, especially for standardized, 
routine, network based services as it can result in the loss of economies of scale and 
of control over scarce financial resources by the central government. Weak 
administrative or technical capacity at local levels may lead to services being 
delivered less efficiently and effectively in some areas of the country (Litvack and 
Seddon, 1999). An illustration is that, in transition countries that are undertaking 
privatization and building a public and industrial infrastructure, the need for 
coherent investment policy is an argument against fiscal decentralization since 
capital resources are scarce and economies of scale is important (Bahl, 1995). 
Moreover, decentralization may impose constraints to the implementation of 
national policies and creation of coordination channels across regions (Guldner, 
1995). Decentralization may allow functions to be captured by local elites and 
distrust between public and private sectors may weaken cooperation at the local 
level.  
In view of these different opinions, we claim that under a significant but 
restrictive set of conditions, decentralization can provide powerful incentives for 
good policy and hence, good macroeconomic performance. In contrast, poorly 
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designed fiscal decentralization can lead to a variety of undesirable outcomes, such 
as macroeconomic imbalances, low growth, and corruption. 
In this study, using a panel data of up to fifty-nine countries a year’s range 
1972 to 2000, we empirically investigate whether there is any evidence for the effect 
of fiscal decentralization on the macroeconomic performance of countries. We first 
set expenditure based and revenue based fiscal decentralization indicators based on 
the various sub levels of government and a proxy for vertical imbalances1. As a 
macroeconomic performance indicator, we take inflation, budget balance, and GDP 
growth of countries. Our main control variable is the share of the expenditure or 
revenue in the GDP for each analysis. Besides, we study whether developed 
countries are different than developing countries with regards to the macroeconomic 
effects of decentralization. Moreover, we consider that social security and defence 
expenditures is pure public good and perform the analysis accordingly. 
Our major findings reveal that there is a negative association between fiscal 
decentralization and inflation for developing countries. In other words, the greater 
fiscal decentralization in developing countries, the less is inflation provided that the 
size of government expenditure is not large. Besides, results show that the effect 
fiscal decentralization on inflation in developed countries is not significant.  
The association between expenditure decentralization and budget deficit is 
not as clear as the case of inflation. Most of our regressions show a negative 
association between decentralization and budget deficit. However, our results are 
consistent that there is a positive association between the size effect of government 
                                                 
1 Vertical imbalance is the ratio of intergovernmental transfer to total tax revenue of subnational 
governments. (De Mello, 2000a) 
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expenditures and budget deficit for developing countries, whereas the association 
between the share of government revenues in GDP and budget deficit is negative for 
developing countries. 
Our results also show that the association between both expenditure and 
revenue decentralization and GDP growth is mixed for developing countries and is 
not significant for developed countries. Moreover, the size effect of government 
expenditure on growth is negative and significant but the association between size 
effects of government revenues and growth is not significant. 
Results show that expenditure and revenue based fiscal decentralization 
indicators have, in general, statistically significant associations with macroeconomic 
variables. On the other hand, in general, proxy for vertical imbalances is not 
significantly associated with macroeconomic performance indicators regardless of 
whether they are used as fiscal decentralization indicators or control variables.  
This study is a result of an attempt to fill, in part, the void in the literature on 
the impact of fiscal decentralization. Our focus is the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and macroeconomic performance. The literature suggested that with 
a good policy design of the fiscal decentralization, especially developing countries 
might achieve desired outcomes. The general conclusion of our empirical work is 
also that developing countries may reduce inflation with enhancement of fiscal 
decentralization, provided that the size of government expenditures is not large. But 
our results are not robust for budget deficit and growth. Besides, the association of 
fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic performance indicators is not statistically 
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significant in developed countries. In addition, in general, the coefficients that proxy 
for vertical imbalances is not statistically significant.    
The outline of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief 
literature survey; Chapter 3 reports data and descriptive statistics. Chapter 4 is the 
methodology part. Results are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to assess the effects of decentralization, it is beneficial to review the 
traditional and new theories about decentralization; the potential impacts of 
decentralization on growth, equity, and macroeconomic stability. In what follows, 
section 2.1 provides a brief account of traditional theories and the new ones. In 
Section 2.2, we discuss the impacts of decentralization on growth (section 2.2.1), on 
equity and redistribution (section 2.2.2) and on macroeconomic stability (2.2.3). 
Next, an important part of decentralization literature, sector studies are analysed 
briefly in section 2.3 in two parts as section 2.3.1 provides a brief report on the 
impacts of decentralization on education and section 2.3.2 provides a brief report on 
the impacts of decentralization on health.  
 
2.1) Traditional and the New Theories 
There are mainly two central theories in the theoretical literature:  the 
traditional and the new one. Traditional theories, which have three branches, 
emphasize allocative benefits of decentralization for information reasons, as the 
allocation of scarce resources is the basic problem in this area. The former theory 
came by the first half of this century.  Hayek (1945) emphasized the important 
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advantages of decentralized decision-making in terms of best utilizing local 
information. In the context of public finance, local governments have better 
information than the national government about local conditions and information 
transmission is costly. Therefore, local governments can make better decisions than 
the national government in providing local public goods and services.  
First branch of the traditional fiscal federalism theory emphasizes the 
benefits of jurisdictional competition. In a study of inter-jurisdictional competition 
dimension, Tiebout (1956) studies how, in a system with many jurisdictions, the 
agents can  “vote with their feet” and locate the jurisdiction that has policies that are 
closer to their preferences. He argued that competition among local governments on 
public expenditure allocation allows residents to better match their preferences with 
a particular menu of local public goods. Such a mechanism would be absent if the 
national government provides the public good uniformly. Federalism also allows 
local experimentation from which other regions may learn and imitate that which is 
successful. The costs of failure under decentralization can be reduced by such 
experimentation  (so called "laboratory of federalism"). While Tiebout focuses on 
horizontal competition2 among different levels of government, Breton (1996) 
concentrates on the vertical competition and its benefits. He claims that different 
levels of government, in any effort to increase their “market share” provide the 
citizens with the optimal type and quantity of public goods. Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) argued that inter-jurisdictional competition approach of Tiebout could limit 
                                                 
2  Vertical competition is the competition between governmental units at different levels, whereas, 
horizontal is between units at the same level.  
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local governments’ behaviour. In some cases, it is better to have interstate collusion 
to prevent undesirable outcomes (Donahue, 1997). 
Optimal division of powers between the central and local governments 
constitutes the second branch of the traditional theories. Drawing on previous ideas, 
Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) built a theory of fiscal federalism, which stresses 
the appropriate assignment of taxes and expenditures to the various levels of 
government to improve welfare. Decentralization theorem, which is the main result 
in this branch, asserts the conditions under which it is more efficient for the local 
government to provide Pareto efficient levels of output than for the central 
government (Oates, 1972). They also suggested that inappropriate decentralization 
might induce a range of allocative distortions, regional inequality, and fiscal 
instability.  
The third branch of the traditional literature focuses on the role of 
organization costs (Breton and Scott, 1978). Similar to the above, in answering the 
assignment decision of the public goods among different levels of government, 
Breton and Scott concluded that whichever level of government is able to provide a 
public good most efficiently should be given sovereignty over that policy area. 
Which level is deemed most efficient will depend on an examination of provision 
and transaction costs, information limitations, heterogeneity of preferences across 
regions, externalities and spillovers, ability to raise taxes or utilize inter-
governmental transfers, and organization costs.  A decentralized system can reduce 
mobility and signalling costs. However, it is likely that it can also increase 
administrative and coordination costs. 
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 Building on these views, second generation theories gave importance to 
other benefits of decentralization by addressing two concerns, which are largely 
ignored by the traditional theories (Weingast, 1995; Wildasin, 1997; McKinnon, 
1997; Qian and Weingast, 1997 and Qian and Roland, 1998).  The new theories 
focus on the incentives of the government.  Particularly, these theories discard the 
traditional approach's assumption that governments are benevolent with full 
commitment power. A government, which often has a private agenda, does not seek 
to maximize social welfare or economic efficiency.  Even if it tries, it may not be 
able make credible commitments. Also, these new theories consider fiscal issues 
narrowly. They clearly address the general issue of government regulation over 
economic activities or the state-market relationships. Besides, these theories claim 
that the government itself is often an obstacle to economic welfare, in particular, for 
the transition and developing economies. Given the enormous power of the 
government, it may be more harmful than good for the purpose of the creation and 
preservation of markets, if government is not restrained with proper incentives. 
Second generation theories examine how “market-preserving federalism” affects the 
behaviour of the government. 
There exist major differences between the traditional and new theories as the 
new theories stress government incentives and the state-market relationships. One 
difference concerns the role of revenue transfers between the central and local 
governments. Assuming a benevolent government, the traditional theory argues for 
the benefits of decentralization of expenditure for its informational advantages. 
However, it also points out that, under some circumstances decentralization leads to 
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allocative distortions and weakening of fiscal capability of the central government. 
With large-scale externalities, and more significantly, with decentralized taxation in 
the presence of inter-jurisdictional competition, expenditure decentralization may 
cause allocative distortions. Besides, decentralization may restrict the central 
government's fiscal ability to lessen regional inequality and maintain 
macroeconomic stability3. Because of these concerns, many traditional theories do 
not consider regional "self-financing" desirable4.  
On the contrary, theories of market-preserving federalism emphasizes the 
importance of government's incentives and the potential benefit of linking local 
government's revenue collection with their expenditure and limiting central 
government's redistribution among local governments to attract local economic 
prosperity. The theory suggests that, despite possible well-known allocative 
distortions, decentralization’s beneficial incentive effects for governments are 
especially valuable for the transition economies.   
The traditional theory and new theories also have some similarities, which 
motivate this study as well. The argument is that both the traditional and new 
theories’ theoretical and empirical contributions all rest on the assumption that the 
design and implementation of a multi-tier system of government can significantly 
affect overall resource allocation in the economy and, thus, stabilization, growth, 
and welfare. However, the casual relationship between decentralization and 
macroeconomic conditions underlying the different approaches differ, substantially.  
 
                                                 
3 Also stated by, Prud’homme, 1995; Huther and Shah, 1996; Ter-Minisian, 1999 
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2.2) Potential Impacts of Decentralization 
Available studies have mainly considered the impact of decentralization on: 
efficiency and growth, equity and redistribution, and macroeconomics.  The most 
common theoretical rationale for decentralization is to attain allocative efficiency in 
the face of different local preferences for local public goods (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 
1972; Musgrave, 1983). Problems may arise with respect to coordination, which is 
costly (Breton and Scott, 1978) and where inter-jurisdictional spillovers are 
important, including stabilization (Tanzi, 1995; Wildasin, 1997; Oates, 1999) and 
distribution (Tresch, 1981).  Oates (1999) argued that the traditional theory contends 
that the central government should have the basic responsibility for macroeconomic 
stabilization and income redistribution in the form of assistance to the poor. 
Because, in the absence of the monetary and exchange-rate privileges and with 
highly open economies that cannot contain much of the expansionary impact of 
fiscal stimuli, provincial, state, and local governments simply have very limited 
means for traditional macroeconomic control of their economies. Similarly, in the 
case of redistribution, with an aggressive local support for the poor, the mobility of 
economic units leads an influx for the poor to that state and exodus of those with 
higher income who must bear the tax burden.    
 
2.2.1) Fiscal Decentralization and Growth  
Issues, on which there is neither theoretical nor empirical agreement, concern 
the direction and significance of the relation between decentralization and the size of 
                                                                                                                                         
4 i.e., local governments depend on their own tax revenue collection to finance their expenditure 
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the public sector, (Oates, 1985; Ehdaie, 1994; Mueller, 1996) and the relation 
between decentralization and the rate of economic growth (Prud’homme 1995; 
Tanzi, 1995; Martinez-Vasquez and McNab, 1997; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhang 
and Zou, 1998; Litvack et al., 1998). The arguments about government size and 
decentralization are based on the leviathan hypothesis5 (Brennan and Buchanan, 
1980). With the competition among jurisdictions to attract taxpayer into their 
territory, constraint has been imposed on fiscal appetite of government, under 
decentralization. Therefore, leviathan hypothesis implies that  “total government 
intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater extent to 
which taxes and expenditures are decentralized” (Brennan and Buchanan, 
1980,p.15). Ehadie has tested the leviathan hypothesis and has found evidence for 
the hypothesis. Like Ehadie, Rodden (2002) suggests that governments grow as fast 
as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental 
transfers. However, he cannot find evidence for the leviathan hypothesis, if public 
spending is funded by autonomous local taxation. Although recent studies support 
the hypothesis, Oates’s (1985) findings do not support the hypothesis.  
Informational advantage of local governments, population mobility and 
competition among local governments guarantee the matching of preferences of 
local communities and government. Consequently, decentralized provision of public 
services increase efficiency. Having the theory, one would expect that 
decentralization of government enhances the prospects for higher growth. However, 
the role of decentralization as a means to foster growth has recently been questioned 
                                                 
5 Brennan and Buchanan (1980) have depicted the government as a Leviathan seeking to maximize 
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(Prud’homme 1995; Tanzi, 1995). The opponents’ strongest argument points out that 
the efficiency gains from fiscal decentralization may not materialize-especially in 
developing countries –since revenue collection and expenditure decisions by local 
governments may be constrained by the central government. In addition, local 
governments may not be as responsive to the citizen’s preference and needs 
especially with corruption, lack of freedom, poverty and low level of education. 
Their ideas are supported by Davoodi and Zou (1998), who found that fiscal 
decentralization does not lead to economic growth in developing countries, but no 
noticeable effect on growth in developed countries is observed. On the contrary, Lin 
and Liu (2000) investigated the effect of decentralization in China on the growth rate 
of per capita GDP and found that the fiscal decentralization has made a significant 
contribution to economic growth. They noted that as well as fiscal decentralization, 
other reforms such as housing responsibility system in the rural sector have been 
conductive to economic growth. However, several methodological problems in these 
studies discount even these mixed results and much more to be done to ensure that 
the measured decentralization-growth relationship is robust.    
 While the general motivation is that decentralization is useful for the 
implementation of economic development, some studies argue that the growth of the 
local public sector may be mainly the result of economic development. As Bahl and 
Linn (1992) note, “decentralization more likely comes with the achievement of a 
higher stage of economic development”(p. 391) and that the “threshold level of 
economic development” at which fiscal decentralization becomes attractive “appears 
                                                                                                                                         
revenues by exploiting its monopoly power over the tax base. 
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to be quite high” (p.393). Wasylenko (2001) points that decentralization is also a 
consequence of economic development. His empirical findings suggest that if 
decentralization is measured in terms of the extent to which state and local 
governments make expenditures, then per capita income appears to be an important 
determinant of decentralization. Besides, Panizza (1999) find some empirical 
regularity that can be used to explain the cross-country variations in the degree of 
fiscal centralization. In his findings, land area, GDP per capita and ethnic-
fractionalisation are all negatively correlated with fiscal decentralization.    
 
2.2.2) Fiscal Decentralization, Equity, and Redistribution  
Equity and distributional concerns is a vital part of the decentralization 
theory. There are some questions, which are priority policy areas in developed, 
developing and transition economies, such as “Should governments redistribute 
people or places?” If they should, which level of government should be responsible 
for such redistribution, and under what conditions? The impact of decentralization 
on interpersonal and inter regional equity, mainly depends on the policy design 
details and institutional arrangements. Public expenditure policy, tax policy and the 
design of intergovernmental transfers are the main channels through which 
decentralization affects interpersonal and interregional equity. Local accountability 
and local political participation by the poor, competition in the delivery of the 
services and resulting price effects are also important to establish equity.  
Some analysts argue that in some circumstances local governments achieve 
such goals more effectively than central governments (Pauly, 1973). Others argue 
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that central redistribution is needed both for effectiveness (Oates, 1972;Musgrave, 
1983) and to overcome biases of local elites (Wilensky, 1974; Inman and Rubinfeld, 
1997).  Another view is that resource mobility and the openness of the local 
economy will frustrate their effort, regardless of what local governments may 
attempt to do in the way of redistribution (Buchanan and Wagner, 1971). Although 
debate on this subject continues, the traditional view that central governments have 
the major role to play in functions of income redistribution still predominates. 
However, it is possible to observe Swiss6 and Danish examples, which indicates that 
the formal assignment of distributional authority to a local government can work. 
The success of above examples lies behind the design of their decentralization 
policy. Supporting this argument, Von Braun and Grote (2000) analysed poverty and 
noted if all three types of decentralization: fiscal, political, and administrative are 
established, decentralization serves the poor.      
 
2.2.3) Fiscal Decentralization and Macroeconomic Stability  
Considering that our major concern in this study is to assess the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic performance, it is noteworthy to 
state that decentralization’s potentially destabilizing effect on the macro economy 
has caused much concern recently (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1995, 2000; Ter-
Minassian, 1997). It is argued that, in decentralized countries, where the local 
governments have significant power, macroeconomic stability can be threatened. 
However, others suggest that destabilizing effects are more likely to reflect 
                                                 
6  In Sweden, cantons have control over health, education and welfare services and priority in levying 
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inappropriate incentives than any problem inherent to decentralization (Spahn, 
1997a and 1997b). It is of course not surprising to see a strong association between 
decentralization and fiscal imbalance at lower levels, in countries that have 
“decentralized” to offload fiscal imbalances from the centre (Wallich, 1994). World 
Bank studies (World bank, 1996a; 1996b; Dillinger, 1997) have examined this issue 
and suggested that destabilization effects arose mainly from design problems, such 
as soft budget constraint between levels of government (Litvack et al., 1998). The 
Philippines, Brazil, and Argentina are commonly cited examples. In the Philippines, 
as half of the revenues is allocated to local governments, the central government is 
very limited in its ability to adjust to critical situations (Litvack and Seddon, 1999).  
In Brazil, collection of revenues was decentralized before expenditure 
responsibilities in the 1990s. Consequently, central government was forced to 
maintain spending levels with a smaller resource base. Argentina is faced with 
problems as subnational governments accrued unsustainable debts and had to be 
bailed out by the central governments. The design of decentralization must ensure a 
match between expenditure responsibilities and revenues at each level of 
government and create an institutional mechanism that will enforce a hard budget 
constraint between levels of government. In other words, decentralization should be 
undertaken in a way that increases rather than decreases accountability (Litvack et 
al., 1998). 
Considerable amount of the literature on decentralization has been devoted to 
undesirable outcomes such as corruption poor governance, deficits (see, for 
                                                                                                                                         
taxes. 
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example, De Mello, 2000b). Despite that decentralization and government 
corruption are closely related on theoretical level, there is much disagreement on 
what the net relationship between them should be (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). Fisman 
and Gatti empirically demonstrate that fiscal decentralization in government 
expenditure is consistently associated with lower measured corruption. Fiscal 
decentralization is also argued to be related with the quality of government and 
governance (Hutter and Shah, 1998; Fisman and Gatti, 2002 and Treisman, 2000). 
De Mello and Barenstein’s (2001) empirical work on this subject asserts that, for any 
level of fiscal decentralization, the higher the share of non-tax revenues and grants 
and transfers from higher levels of government in total subnational revenue, the 
stronger the association between decentralization and governance. Therefore, 
governance is affected not only by fiscal decentralization but also by how 
subnational expenditures are financed. In contrast, Treisman’s (2000) findings 
support that states which have more tiers of government tend to have higher 
perceived corruption and may do a worse job of providing public health service. In 
other words, the quality of government services and decentralization are negatively 
related. On the other hand, Neyapti (2003) empirically demonstrate that fiscal 
decentralization is associated with lower deficits.    
 
2.3) Sector Studies  
Decentralization is usually carried out as a part of the sector reform  (Litvack 
and Seddon, 1999). The main sectors, which are subject to decentralization, are 
education, health care, safety nets infrastructure, irrigation, water supply, sanitation 
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and natural source management. The sector studies are therefore a very important 
part of the decentralization literature. They question whether the theoretical 
justifications are applicable to real life.  
Health and educational sectors are important as they affect not only national 
development but also poverty alleviation and general welfare. The general 
conclusion of sector studies and also experiences is that without proper design, the 
decentralization process may lead to unintended consequences.    
           
2.3.1) Education and Decentralization  
There is an ongoing trend to give schools greater decision-making autonomy 
in order to improve school performance and accountability, on all around the world 
(Burki and Perry, 1999).  Mainly, there are two different types of decentralization: 
decentralization of education to lower levels of government, which is a part of broad 
decentralization process, and to individual schools, which is prompted by poor 
school performance.  
There are two sets of motivations for education decentralization. Firstly, the 
process of decentralization may lead an improvement in efficiency, transparency, 
accountability, and responsiveness of service provision. Then this would lead an 
improvement in quality of schooling and social welfare. The other set highlights the 
technical efficiency. Some of the fiscal burden of education service provision of the 
central government can be diminished by education decentralization. There are clear 
efficiency gains resulting from letting local decision-makers allocate budgets across 
inputs, as the prices and production processes vary across localities.  
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There are mixed results on impacts of decentralization on educational 
services. In Brazil, decentralization increased the overall enrolments, however, 
regional inequalities in access to schooling, per capita expenditures, and quality 
remained unchanged (Litvack and Seddon, 1999). The experiences of Chile, New 
Zealand and Zimbabwe, whose design of decentralized systems has been highly 
criticized, are, also, similar to Brazil’s.  The main problem in these countries is the 
central governments have assigned responsibilities to local governments without 
supplying targeted support to poorer areas.  Quality improvement of education can 
be seen in the experiences of Nicaragua and El Salvador, where students performs 
better at tests, with making more of their own decisions about school functions 
(Litvack and Seddon, 1999).   
The emphasis on the effect of fiscal decentralization on education leads 
many researchers to investigate the issue empirically. De Mello has reported that 
social capital, defined as trust, norms, and network (Putnam, 1995) that foster 
beneficial cooperation in cooperation in society, can be enhanced by fiscal 
decentralization. The findings are suggestive rather than conclusive, of an 
association between social capital and fiscal decentralization. (De Mello, 2000a)  
 
2.3.2) Health and Decentralization   
Within the health sector, decentralization of finances and responsibilities is 
one of the important topics that have emerged in the agenda of national governments 
and international organizations (Robalino et al., 2001). Fiscal decentralization may 
lead more rational and unified health service that caters local preferences. Besides, 
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greater community financing and involvement of the local communities is another 
justification for fiscal decentralization in health services. Furthermore, moving 
streamlined and targeted health programs may lead cost containment. On the other 
hand, responsiveness to local demands is a benefit of decentralization; nevertheless, 
it brings two main disadvantages. Firstly, local officials frequently change and may 
be uninformed about principal national policies. The other is that, local groups may, 
as well, resist national policies. 
Despite all theoretical benefits of decentralization, there is little concrete 
evidence for confirmation. Experiences that have been documented demonstrate that 
achieving the benefits of decentralization depends heavily on policy design (Litvack 
and Seddon, 1999). In Bolivia, designers of the fiscal decentralization have failed to 
take into account existing level of health facilities that local governments inherited 
and used new financial mechanism that fall short behind what is needed. Moreover, 
the policy designers must also consider local conditions and capacities. In 
Philippines, the discrepancy between the costs of health staff benefits promised 
under centrally negotiated labour agreements and the capacity of local governments 
to pay seriously damaged staff morale. In Bolivia, local governments could not 
execute over half of the investment plans due to lack of capacities (Hartmann, 1999).  
There are also successful implementations of the decentralization in health sector, 
such as the Spanish example. The decentralization of health sector increased 
accountability and equity in Spanish health sector (Burki and Perry, 1999). 
There is little empirical evidence of potential benefits of the decentralization 
of fiscal responsibilities in the health sector. Robalino, Picazzo and Voetberg (2001) 
 24 
have questioned the issue by quantitative measurement. Using a panel data on infant 
mortality rates, GDP per capita, and the share of public expenditures managed by 
local governments, they conclude that higher fiscal decentralization is consistently 
associated with lower mortality rates. However, they claim that the results do not 
imply that fiscal decentralization is a magic recipie to improve health outcomes, 
rather a successful decentralization requires strong leadership from the central 
government and a high-quality design.  
 25 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
DATA and DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 In this chapter, we first document the data and the sources in section 3.1. In 
section 3.2, we provide descriptive statistics. 
 
3.1) Data and Sources 
For the empirical part of this study, we utilize time series for each country, 
on current expenditure and revenues of central, provincial, and local levels of 
government and on total expenditure and revenues at central, and provincial level. In 
addition, we use data on gross domestic product and its growth rate, inflation rates, 
general government deficits, and the amount expenditures on defence and social 
security programs. As International Monetary Found’s (IMF) Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS) is the main source for internationally comparable data on 
government finances, we used this data set7. 
Our data set comprises developed and developing countries covering the 
period 1972-2000. Unfortunately, however, the data limitations restrict us to work 
on narrower data set. Although our initial panel consists of a hundred and two 
                                                 
7 GFS provides data on local governmental level only for current expenditures and revenues and not 
for capital expenditures and revenues.  
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countries8, due to missing data problem for some of the countries, the maximum 
number of the countries used in regressions reduced to fifty-nine. The fiscal 
decentralization indicators are the most scarce data in our data list. Time span of the 
fiscal decentralization indicators for each country is available in Appendix 3 (Table 
1). In section 3.1.1 detailed information on fiscal decentralization indicators is 
reported and section 3.1.2 presents information on macroeconomic performance 
indicators.  
 
3.1.1) Fiscal Decentralization Indicators  
There are three different approaches in the literature for measuring fiscal 
decentralization; expenditure-based, revenue-based and indicators of vertical 
imbalances9. The expenditure based indicator measures the ratio of the sub-national 
government expenditure to total government expenditure. Alternatively, the revenue 
based indicator measures the ratio of sub-national government revenue to total 
government revenue. On the other hand, vertical imbalance in intergovernmental 
fiscal relations measures the gap between subnational expenditures and own 
revenues by simply dividing intergovernmental transfers to total tax revenue of 
subnational governments.  
                                                 
8 There is a term “decision decentralization” called by Treisman (2000) to indicate whether scholars 
consider the state to be federal. Clearly, we do not interested in this classification. However, as a 
general fact, the federal states included in data set are: Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, the USA, Malaysia, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, Venezuela, Pakistan, 
and Comoros           
9 See  De Mello, 2000a.    
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In this study, we used three expenditure-based decentralization indicators and 
three revenue-based indicators. The data of intergovernmental transfers is very 
limited in GFS data. Nevertheless, we have formed six other measures to proxy 
vertical imbalances, three of which are the differences between subnational 
expenditures and subnational revenues as ratios to subnational expenditures and the 
rest three are the differences between subnational expenditures and subnational 
revenues in ratio to subnational revenues. 
Expenditure based indicators are as follows. The first measure 
(EXPs&p/TOT) is the ratio of state or provincial government spending to total 
government spending, in other words, the share of state or provincial governments in 
total expenditures10. Secondly, the share of state or provincial government current 
expenditures in total current expenditures is taken as another indicator 
(EXPs&p/CURR). The third measure is the share of local government current 
expenditure in total current expenditures (EXPloc/CURR).  
The revenue based indicators are calculated by replacing the corresponding 
revenue amounts in above formulas. The share of state or provincial governments in 
total revenue (REVs&p/TOT) is the fourth indicator. The state or provincial 
government’s current revenue share (REVs&p/CURR) is the fifth indicator. The 
sixth measure is the local government’s current revenue share (REVloc/CURR).  
As it is stated above, we also generate new indicators by using subnational 
expenditures and revenues, which we call VISPEXPT, VISPEXPC, VILOCEXPC, 
VISPREVT, VISPREVC, and VILOCREVC. VISPEXPT is the ratio of the 
                                                 
10 Total spending is the sum of the current and capital spending. Total revenue is the sum of the 
current revenue and tax revenue.  
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difference between total expenditures and revenues at state or provincial level to 
state or provincial total expenditures. The ratio of the difference between current 
expenditures and revenues at state or provincial level to state or provincial current 
expenditures is VISPEXPC. VILOCEXPC is the ratio of the difference between 
current expenditures and revenues at local level to local current expenditures. 
VISPREVT, VISPREVC and VILOCREVC, replicate the above definitions with the 
exception of corresponding revenue figures in the denominator1112. Vertical 
imbalance is an important indicator of fiscal decentralization. As the tax bases that 
are efficient and simple to administer by local government are few (Bird, 1992) and 
non-tax revenues tend to be limited (De Mello, 2000a), if subnational governments 
are to be main providers of public services, higher-level jurisdictions must share part 
of their revenues with subnational governments and, as a result, bridge the gap 
between spending and revenues mobilized locally. Our proxy uses subnational 
deficit that is inclusive of borrowing and other types of financing as borrowings of 
subnational government guaranteed by central government. 
  
3.1.2) Macroeconomic Performance Indicators  
In this study, inflation, the ratio of budget deficit to GDP, and GDP growth 
will be used as macroeconomic performance indicators. As inflation series exhibit a 
large variance both across the panel sample and within some countries, inflation will 
be illustrated by depreciation in the real value of money (D) 13. With this 
                                                 
11 Explanations for abbreviations, used in this study, are available at Appendix 1.  
12 Cross-correlations for fiscal decentralization indicators are available at Appendix 2. 
13  D in year t is calculated by the formula: D= F/(1+F). F is the average rate of inflation between t 
and t-1. This variable has been used in Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), for similar reasons. 
 29 
characterization, the influence of outliers will be reduced (Cukierman, Webb and 
Neyapti, 1992). Inflation will therefore be referred to hereafter as D. The ratio of 
budget deficit to GDP is abbreviated as DEFGDP and GDP growth as GDPGR. 
 
3.2) Descriptive Statistics 
Based on fiscal decentralization indicators, we produce functional descriptive 
statistics. We first examine the cross-country differentials, by simply taking averages 
of the decentralization measures of the whole period available for each country 
(Table 2). As we look at the column sorted by EXPs&p/TOT, two unexpected 
countries ranked first and second; correspondingly: the Netherlands Antilles14 and 
Turkey15. The cross-section average for this variable is 0.20, which suggest that one 
fifth of total expenditures on the available set of countries are made by states or 
provinces on average. The indicators used by current expenditures give additional 
information; especially for EXPloc/CURR Finland, Denmark and Mongolia are 
shown as highly decentralized.  
Classification of the counties may give additional information. Therefore, we 
divided the sample countries as developed and developing. For developed countries, 
yearly cross-section averages are on Table 3. The data suggest, in general, that fiscal 
decentralization in developed countries has not notably increased since 1970’s, with 
a small fall during the 1980’s. Table 4 provides yearly cross-section averages for 
                                                 
14  The Netherlands Antilles is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and it consists of two groups 
of islands and each island has its own government. This special condition is the major reason for 
decentralization.   
15 For Turkey, GFS only present 1974 and 1975 data. Most probably, the expenditures made by 
Turkish government, after 1974 North Cyprus war, causes a bias in measurement and overrated 
Turkey    
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developing countries only. This one also point that the level of fiscal 
decentralization has not notably change during the 1990’s as compared to the 
1980’s. However, we see that there was a decline in decentralization, particularly, 
using total amounts for calculation, during the 1980’s as compared to the 1970’s. 
The numbers are not perfectly comparable as countries for which data is available 
change from period to period. 
Since social security and defence expenditures are pure public goods, they 
should not be considered a part of expenditures that can be subject to 
decentralization (Panizza, 1999). Therefore, we, also, calculated the indicators with 
excluding the social security and defence expenditures from central government 
expenditures and form additional descriptive tables (Table 5, 6, 7). When we 
compare Table 5 with Table 2, we observe that excluding defence and social security 
expenditures make some differences in the rankings. In Table 6, which illustrates 
developed country averages in the absence of social security and defence 
expenditures EXPs&p/TOT posits a fall in fiscal decentralization since 1970’s. 
However, the other indictors in Table 6 illustrate either no change or an increase of 
fiscal decentralization. In the case of developing countries, EXPs&p/TOT and 
EXPs&p/CURR exhibit a downward trend in fiscal decentralization in less 
developed countries. However, EXPloc/CURR still indicates a small increase in 
fiscal decentralization level.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
For our study, panel data has several advantages over cross-section or time-
series data sets. The primary advantage of a panel data set over a cross-section is its 
efficiency in modelling differences in behaviour across individuals. They increase 
the degree of freedom and reduce the collinearity among explanatory variables, as 
they provide large number of data points (Hsiao, 1986). Thus, the efficiency of the 
estimates is improved. Moreover, as panel data makes use of information to examine 
intertemporal dynamics and individuality of the entities, we are better able to control 
the effects of missing or unobserved data. Considering the advantages, we claim 
that, the association between fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic 
performance can be estimated best by using panel data techniques. The basic 
equation to be estimated is as follows: 
  
Eit = αi + βFit + γCit + εit,                                                 (1) 
 
where E denotes a measure of macroeconomic performance indicator, F denotes a 
measure of fiscal decentralization indicator, C denotes a set of control variables, 
subscript it stands for country  i at time t, and αi is the fixed effect per country.  
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The basic hypothesis to be tested here is whether β is equal to zero, in 
equation (1). In this study, the set of control variables (Cit) comprises of government 
size, the product of developed country dummy (DC) with government size, and the 
product of DC with fiscal decentralization indicator. We use six government size 
indicators corresponding to our fiscal decentralization indicator. Our first 
government size indicator is the ratio of total expenditure at central and state or 
provincial level to GDP (EXPT/GDP). Our second government size indicator is the 
ratio of current expenditure at central and state or provincial level to GDP 
(EXPSP&CC/GDP). The ratio of current expenditure at central and local level to 
GDP is the third government size indicator (EXPCLC/GDP). We also use 
corresponding revenue based government size indicators with revenue based fiscal 
decentralization indicators. The ratio of total revenue at central and state or 
provincial level to GDP is the fourth indicator (REVT/GDP). Fifth government size 
indicator is the ratio of current revenues at central and state or provincial level to 
GDP (REVSP&CC/GDP). Lastly, the ratio of current revenues at central and local 
level to GDP is the sixth indicator (REVCLC/GDP). When we are using GDP 
growth as a macroeconomic performance indicator, we take another control variable, 
DD, a dummy for high inflation16. The reason for the use of high inflation dummy is 
just to control fundamental association between economic growth and inflation. By 
using developed country dummy, we would like to investigate whether developed 
countries are different than less developed countries with regards to macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal decentralization and government size. Additionally, in some of the 
                                                 
16 The threshold level for D is taken as 0.2, in this study, corresponding to the inflation rate of 20% 
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regressions we take VISPEXPT, VISPEXPC, VILOCEXPC and relevant revenue 
counterparts as a control variable to investigate whether there is any association 
between these variables and macroeconomic performance indicators, in addition to 
the other fiscal decentralization indicators. 
There are two basic frameworks used to generalize the above model (Greene, 
1993). The fixed effect approach behaves αi   as a group specific constant term in the 
regression model as it take the assumption that the differences across units can be 
captured in differences in the constant term. Then, our model is (1) 
On the other hand, “In the random effects model, the αi   are treated as 
random variables rather than fixed constants ”(Maddala, 1992 p575). Specifically, 
the random effects approach denotes that αi   is a group specific disturbance. It is 
different than εi in a manner that for each group, a disturbance enters the regression 
identically in each period. Then the model is: 
 
   Eit = α + βFit + γCit + ui + εit                                       (2) 
 
Regarding these approaches, the question is that, which model should be 
used? Both models have their own advantages and limitations. In some regressions, 
we may doubt that ui  is correlated with some of the explanatory variables. Besides, 
having omitted variables that are correlated with observed variables leads to omitted 
variable bias. The fixed effects model rules out this bias. On the other hand, the 
random effects may suffer from the inconsistency due to omitted variables as it 
                                                                                                                                         
per year. 
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treats individual effects as uncorrelated with the regressors. The disadvantage of 
fixed effects model is that heterogeneity is actually a random effect (Maddala, 
1992). Fortunately, the Hausman test can be used to decide which one to choose 
(Greene, 1993). The Hausman test is based on the idea that under the hypothesis of 
no correlation among individual effects, both OLS and GLS are consistent but OLS 
is inefficient, while under the alternative hypothesis, GLS is not consistent. 
Therefore, if we reject the null hypothesis, we will use fixed effects approach. 
Otherwise, we will use random effects approach. The results of the Hausman Tests 
are available at Table 8.  Test results reveal that for majority of the models that take 
D as dependent variable it is appropriate to use fixed effects approach. On the other 
hand, for majority of the models that take GDPGR as dependent variable, it is 
inappropriate to use fixed effect approach. Nevertheless, for twenty out of twenty-
four regressions that take DEFGDP as left-hand side variable, it is appropriate to use 
fixed effects approach.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
By using our model, we regress each of the three macroeconomic 
performance indicators on one measure of fiscal decentralization indicator and the 
control variables at a time. We summarize these results at Table 9 through Table 16. 
Section 5.1 provides an analysis of regression results, where inflation is dependent 
variable. The results about budget deficit are available at section 5.2. Finally, section 
5.3 provides the findings on the growth. 
 
5.1) Inflation 
   Table 9 presents the regression results when the expenditure based fiscal 
decentralization measures are used. In columns under D, results show that fiscal 
decentralization’s impact on inflation is negative at statistically significant levels for 
developing countries. However this finding is not supported for developed countries, 
as the coefficients do not imply any relationship at statistically significant levels 
(read from the sum of the coefficients for respective decentralization indicator and 
their interaction with the DC dummy)17. Additionally, we observe in the second and 
                                                 
17  With Wald Test, we test whether the sum of the coefficients of fiscal decentralization and the 
product of developed country dummy with fiscal decentralization indicator is equal to zero.   
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third columns that for less developed countries there is a positive association 
between government size (EXPSP&CC/GDP, EXPCLC/GDP) and inflation. In the 
third regression that takes EXPloc/CURR as fiscal decentralization indicator, the 
number of observations is greatest.  
  Regressions in Table 10 is different than Table 9 in that instead of 
expenditure based fiscal decentralization indicators, we used revenue based fiscal 
decentralization indicators and the relevant control variables. The results under D in 
Table 10 confirm our initial findings about the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
inflation for developing countries at statistically significant levels. Again, there is 
not any significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and inflation for 
developed countries. However, the results indicate that the greater the government 
revenues with respect to GDP, the lower is inflation in less developed countries. 
 Regarding the debate on social security and defence expenditures, we also 
formed additional nine regressions, which are presented at Table 11. Results on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization indicators and inflation confirm our 
previous findings. The coefficients of the fiscal decentralization indicators indicate a 
negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and inflation for developing 
countries. Besides, the size effect of government expenditures on inflation is positive 
at statistically significant levels in developing countries and it is much more in this 
set of regressions than the set in Table 9. 
 In Table 12, we modified regressions in Table 9 by adding VISPEXPT, 
VISPEXPC, and VILOCEXPC (proxies for vertical imbalances) to regressions 
respectively. Firstly, the results under D are very similar to Table 9 as they indicate 
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significant association between fiscal decentralization and inflation for only 
developing countries. Although the coefficients of the proxies are not statistically 
significant, modification increased the coefficients of fiscal decentralization and 
consequently, the effect of fiscal decentralization on inflation. In addition, the size 
effect of government expenditures, in developing countries remains positive and 
statistically significant for all regressions.  
 Regressions in Table 13 contain revenue counterparts of the variables in the 
regressions of Table 12. Like Table 12, regressions point out that there is a 
statistically significant negative association between decentralization and inflation 
for developing countries but there is no significant effect of decentralization on 
inflation for developed countries. The coefficients of the size of government 
revenues are statistically significant and negative for the first and second columns 
only. However, we do not observe any significant effect of government revenues 
with respect to GDP on inflation in the third regression. In this table, for developing 
countries, coefficient of our proxy for vertical imbalances implies a significant and 
negative relationship between inflation and state or provincial budget deficit in ratio 
to state or provincial revenues, whereas we observe a statistically significant positive 
association between VILOCREVC and inflation. Though the first finding is an 
anomaly, the latter result is more reliable due to a much larger data set. 
 Once more, we perform the same set of regressions by excluding social 
security and defence expenditures from central government expenditures. The results 
under D in Table 14 are similar to the results in Table 12 with two exceptions. Size 
effect of government, in developing countries is significant for the second and third 
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definitions but not for the first definition. Additionally, for all regressions, the 
coefficients of subnational deficits in ratio to subnational expenditures are 
statistically significant and imply a positive relationship between proxy for vertical 
imbalances and inflation. 
 Table 15 and 16 present the results using proxies of vertical imbalances only 
(without the rest of the fiscal decentralization indicators). Our measures in Table 15 
are expenditure based and the measures in Table 16 are revenue based. The second 
column under D in Table 15 implies that there is a negative relationship between the 
ratio of the difference state or provincial total expenditures and revenues to total 
state or provincial revenues and inflation. On the other hand, the third column points 
out that the relationship between proxy for vertical imbalances and inflation is 
negative, as it should be. The results also show that if the local current budget deficit 
with respect to the current expenditures of local governments is larger, inflation will 
be higher. Besides, there is a positive association between government size and 
inflation, as before.  In Table 16, results under column 3 show that there is a positive 
relationship between local current budget deficit with respect to local current 
revenues and inflation for developing countries. The other proxies of vertical 
imbalances do not have any significant coefficients. In addition, first and second 
column under D indicate that the greater the government revenues with respect to 
GDP in less developed countries, the lower is inflation18.  
                                                 
18 We also estimate these models by adopting new control variables instead of EXPT/GDP, 
EXPSP&CC/GDP, EXPCLC/GDP, REVT/GDP, REVSP&CC/GDP, and REVCLC/GDP. Our new 
control variables contain corresponding subnational expenditures or revenues in nominator instead of 
total expenditures or revenues and GDP in denominator.  The results show that the contradictory 
result in expenditure-based regressions is carried to revenue based regression results. The 
aforementioned new control variables are negatively correlated with inflation.  
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5.2) Deficits 
 As we come to the results of the regressions where DEFGDP is dependent 
variable, Table 9 indicates that if the fiscal decentralization is greater in developing 
countries then there will be less budget deficit in those countries. However our 
results do not show any relationship between fiscal decentralization and budget 
deficit for developed countries. Besides, the size effect of government expenditures 
on budget deficit in developing countries is statistically significant and positive for 
all three regressions. 
 The regression results in Table 10 under DEFGDP confirm our previous 
findings about fiscal decentralization’s impact on budget deficit in developing 
countries in column two and three, though, first column shows a positive correlation 
with a significant sign. Besides, the third column indicates that there is a positive 
correlation between fiscal decentralization and budget deficit for developed 
countries. The results in first and second column also imply that the larger are 
government revenues with respect to GDP in developing countries, the lower are 
deficits.  
 When we exclude social security and defence expenditures, for developing 
countries, negative association between fiscal decentralization and budget deficit 
remain for the first two columns in Table 11. However, the coefficient of the third 
regression is not statistically significant. Like Table 9, the coefficients of the size 
effect of government expenditures imply a positive association with budget deficit 
for developing countries. 
 40 
 When we add new control variables to regressions in Table 9, as Table 12 
presents, regression results under DEFGDP are similar to our initial finding in Table 
9, with regards to the association between fiscal decentralization and budget deficit. 
All three columns show a statistically significant and positive association between 
fiscal decentralization and budget deficits for developing countries. In addition, 
however, the effect of fiscal decentralization is now much greater than the former 
case. Besides, with this addition, first and second column imply that fiscal 
decentralization has negative association with budget deficits in developed countries 
as well. Like previous tables, the size effect is statistically significant and positive 
under DEFGDP. Moreover, the coefficients of VISPEXPC and VILOCEXPC are 
statistically significant and positive and indicate that there is a positive association 
between vertical imbalances and budget deficits, in developing countries.     
 In Table 13, we observe a negative association between fiscal 
decentralization and budget deficit at statically significant levels for only the results 
of the third column and for only developing countries. The third column also 
presents a significant and positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
budget deficits for developed countries. In addition, third column implies a positive 
association between VILOCREVC and budget deficits for developing countries. On 
the other hand, the first and second columns indicate a negative association between 
the size effect of government revenues and budget deficits, like the set under 
DEFGDP in Table 10. 
 The results in Table 14 about the association between fiscal decentralization 
and budget deficit are similar to Table 11. Results indicate that there is negative 
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association between fiscal decentralization and budget deficits for developing 
countries and the size effect of government expenditures are positively correlated 
with budget deficits at statistically significant levels. All three definitions of fiscal 
decentralization show statistically significant positive association between fiscal 
decentralization and budget deficits for developing countries. Besides, for 
developing counties, the results show a positive association between VISPEXPT and 
budget deficits at statistically significant levels. However, the results indicate 
contradictory association between fiscal decentralization and budget deficit, for 
developed countries at statistically significant levels.  
 Table 15 and Table 16 do not bring much new information on the association 
between fiscal decentralization and budget deficit. In Table 15, the association 
between fiscal decentralization and budget deficit is not at statistically significant 
levels. Like previous results, the size effect of government expenditures is positively 
associated with budget deficits in developing countries. In Table 16, the results show 
a contradictory result for developing countries that the coefficient of fiscal 
decentralization is statistically significant and negative in the first column under 
DEFGDP but it is statistically significant and positive in the third column. The 
results in the third column indicate a positive association between fiscal 
decentralization and budget deficits at statistically significant levels for developed 
countries. The first and second columns imply that the greater the government 
revenues with respect to GDP the less is budget deficits, in developing countries19. 
                                                 
19 With replacement of control variables in Table 15 with the ratio of subnational counterparts to GDP 
indicate a negative significant coefficient in the second definition and a positive and significant 
coefficient in the third definition of fiscal decentralization. The results of the table 16 are similar to 
previous results.  
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5.3) Growth 
When we regress growth in our model, we have most mixed and unexpected 
results in the whole study. Regression results under GDPGR in Table 9 present that 
for developing countries, there is a positive association between fiscal 
decentralization and growth at statistically significant levels for the first two 
definitions of fiscal decentralization. However, the effect of fiscal decentralization 
on growth is not statistically significant and positive for developed countries. In 
addition, the size effect of government expenditures is significant and negative on 
growth, for developing countries.  
 In Table 10 that uses revenue-based fiscal decentralization indicators, we 
have same results with regards to first and second column under GDPGR but, the 
results of the third column is different then the results in Table 9 as the coefficient of 
fiscal decentralization indicator for developing countries indicates a negative 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth, which is unexpected. The 
coefficients of the size of effect variables of government revenues are not significant 
in these regressions. 
 Excluding the social security and defence expenditures from central 
government expenditures leads to further contradictory results. The first and second 
columns indicate a positive association between fiscal decentralization and growth. 
On the other hand, the third definition of expenditure based fiscal decentralization 
implies a negative association between the variables. Moreover, the third column 
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points out a significant and negative size effect of government expenditures on 
growth as in Table 9.  
Regressions of growth on fiscal decentralization indicators and the relevant 
control variables, including the proxies of vertical imbalances do not produce any 
significant results about the association between decentralization and growth 
generally. In Table 12, the second definition of fiscal decentralization indicator 
implies that there is a positive association between fiscal decentralization and 
growth in developing countries. On the other hand, the first and third columns 
indicate that the greater government expenditures with respect to GDP, the lower is 
growth. Besides, in Table 12, there is not any significant association between 
proxies of fiscal decentralization and growth. In Table 13 that uses revenue based 
fiscal decentralization indicator, the only statistically significant association is 
between the third definition of fiscal decentralization and growth, in developing 
countries and the sign is negative. With regards to the association between fiscal 
decentralization and growth, specifications reported in Table 14, 15, and 16 
consistently do not present any significant coefficients20. 
To sum up, we reach the most expected results when we regress inflation on 
fiscal decentralization indicator and the relevant control variables. The results of 
regressions that take budget deficit as the dependent variable are not as robust as in 
the case of inflation, though they are not as mixed as the results of the regressions 
that take growth as the dependent variable. The effects of fiscal decentralization on 
dependent variables are more robust in the expected directions in developing 
                                                 
20 Aforementioned replacement of new control variables in regressions where growth is left-hand side 
variable, do not lead any significant coefficient of fiscal decentralization indicator.   
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countries than in developed countries. The reason for this difference can be 
explained as follows: in developed countries economic system is generally more 
efficient than developing countries, and therefore, it is difficult to explain the 
macroeconomic performance with fiscal decentralization only. Results show that 
expenditure and revenue based fiscal decentralization indicators have statistically 
significant associations with macroeconomic variables. On the other hand, in 
general, proxies for vertical imbalances are not significantly associated with 
macroeconomic performance indicators, regardless of whether they are used as fiscal 
decentralization indicator or control variables. The only exception is that 
VILOCREVC is positively associated with macroeconomic performance indicators 
in developing countries.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION  
Decentralization has become an important policy issue in recent years. 
International organizations allocate more space for fiscal decentralization in their 
agenda. There are vast amount of studies that emphasizes the benefits of 
decentralization, whereas there are also some studies that attempt to highlight 
deficiencies of decentralization, especially based on developing country experiences 
with decentralization. There are, however, examples of successful and unsuccessful 
implementations of decentralization in developing world.  
In view of the opposing arguments and real life examples about fiscal 
decentralization, we search for empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on macroeconomic performance. Hence, our empirical findings 
contribute to the literature on fiscal decentralization, as there is little explicit 
empirical analysis on this. 
Based on the existing literature, we anticipate that, with a good policy 
design, fiscal decentralization can provide powerful incentives for good 
macroeconomic performance such as low inflation, budget balance and persistent 
growth. In this study, we examine the association between fiscal decentralization 
indicators and macroeconomic performance by using a panel data on up to fifty-nine 
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countries and up to twenty-eight years. From the results of the regressions, we 
observe that for developing countries there is clear negative association between 
fiscal decentralization, both expenditure and revenue types, and inflation. This 
means that by introducing fiscal decentralization in developing countries, inflation 
level may be reduced provided that overall government expenditure size is not large 
and government revenue size is large. Our regressions do not imply any significant 
association between fiscal decentralization and inflation for developed countries.      
 Although not very robust, the association between fiscal decentralization and 
budget deficit for developing countries is observed to be negative for most of the 
regressions. There are two unexpected coefficients that show a positive association 
between two variables. Reasonable explanation for this unexpected result may be the 
improper design of the decentralization and loss of economies of scale that prevent 
efficiency gains of decentralization on budget in developing countries. For 
developed countries, the association between fiscal decentralization and budget 
deficit is not clear. Also, as expected, the size effect of government expenditures on 
budget deficit is positive and the size effect of government revenues is negative at 
statistically significant levels in developing countries. 
 Our most ambiguous or unexpected empirical results are in regards to the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and GDP growth. For developing 
countries, the results show ambiguous association. The observation of negative 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and GDP growth can be explained as the 
loss of economies of scale argument. As stated before, decentralization may not 
always be efficient, especially for standardized, routine, network based services, 
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since it can result in the loss of economies of scale and of loss control over scarce 
financial resources by the central government. Besides, our regressions do not imply 
any significant association between fiscal decentralization and growth for developed 
countries. Although the size effect of government revenues on growth is 
insignificant, the size effect of government expenditures on government revenues is 
negative and statistically significant for developing countries.  
 The general conclusion is that fiscal decentralization may lead to desirable 
macroeconomic effects, especially in developing countries. Nevertheless, as we have 
reviewed, the design of the fiscal decentralization is important. The possible reasons 
for the unexpected results may depend on the deficiencies in the design of 
decentralization. 
 Finally, we concede that our results are suggestive rather than conclusive due 
to data inadequacies. Data limitations prevent us from analysing an important fiscal 
decentralization indicator, vertical imbalances, which is the ratio of 
intergovernmental transfers to total tax revenue of subnational governments, 
properly. As the topic is interesting and open to debate, there is more room for 
further research empirically, especially on the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and sectoral issues.      
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Abbreviation Description Source
D Normalized rate of inflation (inflation rate/ (1+inflation rate)) GFS, IMF
DC Dummy for developed countries GFS, IMF
DEFGDP Overall budget deficits / GDP GFS, IMF
EXPclc/GDP Current Government Expenditure (Central + Local) / GDP GFS, IMF
EXPloc/CURR Current Expenditure by Local Governments/ Current
Government Expenditure (Central + Local)
GFS, IMF
EXPs&p/CURR Current Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments/ 
Current Government Expenditure (Central + State and 
Provincial)
GFS, IMF
EXPs&p/TOT Total Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments/ Total
Government Expenditure (Central + State and Provincial)
GFS, IMF
EXPsp&cc/GDP Current Government Expenditure (Central + State and 
Provincial) / GDP
GFS, IMF
EXPt/ GDP Total Government Expenditure (Central + State and Provincial) 
/ GDP
GFS, IMF
GDPgr Rate of growth in real GDP GFS, IMF
REVclc/GDP Current Government Revenue (Central + Local) / GDP GFS, IMF
REVloc/CURR Current Revenue by Local Governments/ Current Government
Revenue (Central + Local)
GFS, IMF
REVs&p/CURR Current Revenue by State and Provincial Governments/ Current
Government Revenue (Central + State and Provincial)
GFS, IMF
REVs&p/TOT Total Revenue by State and Provincial Governments/ Total
Government Revenue (Central + State and Provincial)
GFS, IMF
REVsp&cc/GDP Current Government Revenue (Central + State and Provincial) / 
GDP
GFS, IMF
REVt/ GDP Total Government Revenue (Central + State and Provincial) / 
GDP
GFS, IMF
VILOCEXPC (Current Expenditure by Local Governments- Current Revenue 
by Local Governments) / Current Expenditure by Local 
Governments                     
GFS, IMF
VILOCREVC (Current Expenditure by Local Governments- Current Revenue 
by Local Governments) / Current Revenue by Local 
Governments                     
GFS, IMF
VISPEXPC (Current Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments- 
Current Revenue by State and Provincial Governments) / 
Current Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments           
GFS, IMF
VISPEXPT (Total Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments- Total 
Revenue by State and Provincial Governments) / Total 
Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments                     
GFS, IMF
VISPREVC (Current Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments- 
Current Revenue by State and Provincial Governments) / 
Current Revenue by State and Provincial Governments                 
GFS, IMF
VISPREVT (Total Expenditure by State and Provincial Governments- Total 
Revenue by State and Provincial Governments) / Total Revenue 
by State and Provincial Governments                     
GFS, IMF
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Correlations  among the fiscal decentralization indicators used in the anaysis
EXPs&p/TOT EXPs&p/CURR EXPloc/CURR REVs&p/TOT REVs&p/CURR REVloc/CURR VISPEXPT VISPEXPCVILOCEXPCVISPREVT VISPREVC VILOCREVC
EXPs&p/TOT 1
EXPs&p/CURR 0,99 1
EXPloc/CURR 0,47 0,52 1
REVs&p/TOT 0,93 0,89 0,56 1
REVs&p/CURR 0,90 0,89 0,60 0,99 1
REVloc/CURR 0,38 0,38 0,91 0,46 0,45 1
VISPEXPT -0,32 -0,20 -0,31 -0,60 -0,60 -0,29 1
VISPEXPC -0,02 0,07 -0,05 -0,32 -0,32 -0,09 0,85 1
VILOCEXPC 0,26 0,34 0,29 0,32 0,35 -0,03 -0,18 0,11 1
VISPREVT -0,23 -0,18 -0,19 -0,44 -0,48 -0,19 0,70 0,58 -0,05 1
VISPREVC -0,17 -0,13 -0,18 -0,44 -0,44 -0,17 0,68 0,58 -0,03 0,99 1
VILOCREVC 0,13 0,28 0,16 0,21 0,35 -0,18 -0,24 0,01 0,82 -0,11 -0,10 1
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APPENDIX 3: Tables 
Table 1: Data Covarage for each Country
EXPs&p/TOT EXPs&p/TOT EXPloc/TOT REVs&p/TOT REVs&p/TOT REVloc/TOT
Argentina 1979-1998 1979-1998 na 1979-1998 1979-1998 na
Australia 1972-1999 1972-1998 1980-1999 1972-1999 1980-1999 1980-1999
Austria 1972-1999 1972-1999 1980-1999 1972-1999 1980-1999 1980-1999
Belgium 1986-1989 1986-1989 1980-1998 1986-1989 1986-1989 1980-1989
Bolivia 1986-1998 1986-1998 1985-1998 1985-1998 1985-1998 1985-1998
Brazil* 1972-1978&1980-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998
Burkina Faso 1977 na na 1977 na na
Canada 1974-1997 1979-1997 1980-1997 1974-1997 1980-1997 1980-1997
Chile na na 1980-1988&1992-2000 na na 1980-1988&1992-2000
Colombia 1974-1986 1974-1986 1980-1986 1974-1986 1980-1986 1980-1986
Costa Rica na na 1980-2000 nn na 1980-2000
Denmark na na 1980-2000 na na 1980-2000
Dominican Republic na na 1983-1996 na na 1980-1996
Ethiopia na na 1980-1981 na na 1980-1988
Finland na na 1980-1998 na na 1980-1998
France 1982-1984 na 1980-1997 na na 1980-1997
Gambia, The na na 1980-1982 na na 1980-1982
Germany 1973-1998 1974-1998 1980-1998 1973-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998
Greece na na 1980-1982 na na 1980-1982
Guatemala na na 1980-1982 na na 1980-1982
Iceland na na 1980-1998 na na 1980-1998
India 1974-1997 1974-1997 1980-1982 1974-1997 1980-1997 1984-1987
Indonesia 1975-1993 1975-1993 1980-1989&1994-1998 1975-1993 1980-1993 1980-1989&1994-1998
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1972-1990 1972-1990 1980-1989 1972-1990 1980-1990 1980-1989
Ireland na na 1980-1997 na na 1980-1997
Israel na na 1980-1996 na na 1980-1996
Italy na na 1985-1989&1995-1999 na na 1985-1989&1995-1999
Japan na na na na na na
Korea, Rep. 1972-1978 1977-1978 na 1972-1978 na na
Luxembourg** na na 1980-1997 na na 1980-1997
Madagascar na na 1980-1982 n na 1980-1982
Malaysia 1972-1997 1985-1997 1981-1997 1972-1997 1991-1997 1985
Mauritius na na 1987-1999 na na 1980-1985&1987-1999
Mexico 1972-1998 1972-1998 1980-1998 1972-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998
Mongolia na na 1992-1998 na na 1992-1999
Netherlands 1987-1989 na 1980-1997 1987-1989 na 1980-1997
Netherlands Antilles 1972&1974-1978 na 1980-1995 1972&1974-1978 na 1980-1995
Nicaragua na na 1988-1993&1995 na na 1988-1993&1995
Norway na na 1980-1998 na na 1980-1998
Pakistan 1975-1979 1977-1978 na 1975-1979 na na
Panama na na 1980-1994 na na 1980-1994
Paraguay na na 1980&1984-1993 na na 1980&1984-1993
Peru 1972-1977&1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1972-1977&1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999
Portugal 1977&1987-1998 1987-1998 1987-1998 1977&1987-1998 1987-1998 1987-1998
South Africa 1973&1977-1999 1977-1999 1980-1999 1973&1977-1999 1980-1999 1980-1999
Spain 1972-1997 1977-1997 1980-1997 1972-1997 1980-1997 1980-1997
Sri Lanka 1973 na 1982-1986 1973 na 1980-1986
Sweden na na 1980-1999 na na 1980-1999
Switzerland 1972-1984&1991-1998 1972-1984&1991-1998 1980-1984&1991-1998 1972-1984&1991-1998 1980-1984&1991-1998 1980-1984&1991-1998
Thailand 1989 na 1980-2000 1989 na 1980-2000
Trinidad and Tobago na na 1993-1995 na na 1981-1982&1993-1995
Tunisia 1974 na 1981-1982 1974 na 1981-1982
Turkey 1974-1975 na na 1974-1975 na na
United Kingdom na na 1980-1998 na na 1980-1998
United States 1972-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998 1972-1998 1980-1998 1980-1998
Uruguay na na 1989-1997 na na na
Venezuela 1972-1985 na na 1979-1985 na na
Zambia na na 1980 na na 1980
Zimbabwe na na 1980-1991 na na 1980-1991
*for the years1995-1996 data is not available
** for the year 1989 data is not available
Sorted by: EXPs&p/TOT EXPs&p/CURR EXPloc/CURR
Netherlands Antilles 0,65 Canada 0,48 Netherlands Antilles 0,62
Turkey 0,51 India 0,42 Denmark 0,44
Canada 0,49 Australia 0,36 Finland 0,38
India 0,45 Argentina 0,35 Sweden 0,36
Switzerland 0,38 Switzerland 0,35 Mongolia 0,35
Argentina 0,38 United States 0,29 Norway 0,29
Australia 0,38 Pakistan 0,28 Canada 0,28
Germany 0,30 Germany 0,28 Switzerland 0,28
United States 0,30 Colombia 0,25 United States 0,27
Pakistan 0,29 Brazil 0,25 Ireland 0,24
Peru 0,26 Korea, Rep. 0,21 Netherlands 0,23
Brazil 0,25 South Africa 0,18 United Kingdom 0,23
Colombia 0,23 Mexico 0,17 Italy 0,22
Korea, Rep. 0,19 Indonesia 0,16 Zimbabwe 0,20
Mexico 0,19 Austria 0,15 Iceland 0,20
South Africa 0,18 Peru 0,12 Germany 0,19
Malaysia 0,17 Malaysia 0,11 Austria 0,17
Austria 0,16 Spain 0,10 France 0,14
France 0,15 Bolivia 0,10 Spain 0,13
Bolivia 0,15 Portugal 0,02 Brazil 0,12
Indonesia 0,12 Belgium 0,00 Belgium 0,12
Spain 0,10 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 Israel 0,11
Portugal 0,02 Luxembourg 0,10
Belgium 0,00 Average 0,21 Uruguay 0,09
Burkina Faso 0,00 South Africa 0,09
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 Colombia 0,09
Netherlands 0,00 Nicaragua 0,07
Sri Lanka 0,00 Bolivia 0,07
Thailand 0,00 Peru 0,07
Tunisia 0,00 Chile 0,06
Venezuela, RB 0,00 Australia 0,06
Zambia 0,06
Average 0,20 Portugal 0,06
Thailand 0,05
Trinidad and 0,05
Sri Lanka 0,04
Mauritius 0,04
Greece 0,04
Mexico 0,04
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,04
Gambia, The 0,03
Madagascar 0,03
Tunisia 0,03
Guatemala 0,03
Dominican Republic 0,03
Malaysia 0,03
Costa Rica 0,03
Indonesia 0,02
Panama 0,02
Paraguay 0,02
Ethiopia 0,01
India 0,00
Average 0,13
Table 2: Rankings of the Countries with respect to Fiscal Decentralization of Government Expenditures 
(1972-2000)
Note: Time coverages of countries are not uniform. For instance. data on Turkey refers only to years 1974 
and 1975. 
Table 3 :   Country Averages per year, Developed Country Sample Only:
EXPs&p/TOT EXPs&p/CURR EXPloc/CURR REVs&p/TOTREVs&p/CURRREVloc/CURR
1972 0,25 0,28 na 0,18 na na
1973 0,27 0,29 na 0,20 na na
1974 0,30 0,29 na 0,23 na na
1975 0,29 0,29 na 0,23 na na
1976 0,29 0,28 na 0,23 na na
1977 0,29 0,23 na 0,24 na na
1978 0,29 0,23 na 0,24 na na
1979 0,29 0,27 na 0,24 na na
1980 0,29 0,27 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,17
1981 0,29 0,28 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,17
1982 0,27 0,28 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,17
1983 0,27 0,28 0,23 0,24 0,24 0,18
1984 0,27 0,27 0,23 0,24 0,24 0,18
1985 0,28 0,27 0,22 0,23 0,23 0,16
1986 0,24 0,23 0,22 0,20 0,20 0,16
1987 0,22 0,24 0,22 0,17 0,20 0,16
1988 0,30 0,29 0,23 0,24 0,24 0,17
1989 0,22 0,24 0,23 0,18 0,20 0,17
1990 0,30 0,29 0,22 0,24 0,24 0,16
1991 0,31 0,30 0,23 0,25 0,25 0,17
1992 0,32 0,30 0,23 0,25 0,25 0,18
1993 0,32 0,30 0,24 0,25 0,25 0,17
1994 0,32 0,30 0,23 0,25 0,25 0,17
1995 0,32 0,30 0,23 0,26 0,25 0,17
1996 0,32 0,30 0,22 0,25 0,25 0,17
1997 0,33 0,31 0,22 0,26 0,25 0,16
1998 0,31 0,29 0,24 0,25 0,24 0,19
1999 0,30 0,18 0,24 0,20 0,20 0,20
2000 na na 0,45 na na 0,34
Ave. of 70's 0,28 0,27 na 0,22 na na
Ave.of 80's 0,27 0,26 0,23 0,22 0,22 0,17
Ave.of 90's 0,31 0,29 0,23 0,25 0,24 0,18
Note: Country coverages are not the same over time and across different indicators.
Table 4:   Country Averages per year, Developing Country Sample Only:
EXPs&p/TOT EXPs&p/CURR EXPloc/CURR REVs&p/TOT REVs&p/CURR REVloc/CURR
1972 0,21 0,13 na 0,24 na na
1973 0,16 0,14 na 0,15 na na
1974 0,26 0,24 na 0,26 na na
1975 0,27 0,20 na 0,26 na na
1976 0,26 0,20 na 0,24 na na
1977 0,22 0,21 na 0,19 na na
1978 0,23 0,21 na 0,18 na na
1979 0,19 0,20 na 0,14 na na
1980 0,19 0,19 0,08 0,13 0,14 0,07
1981 0,20 0,21 0,07 0,14 0,15 0,07
1982 0,18 0,20 0,08 0,13 0,14 0,07
1983 0,19 0,21 0,10 0,13 0,15 0,08
1984 0,20 0,21 0,10 0,13 0,15 0,08
1985 0,18 0,19 0,09 0,11 0,11 0,08
1986 0,19 0,17 0,10 0,13 0,13 0,09
1987 0,17 0,15 0,09 0,12 0,11 0,08
1988 0,18 0,16 0,09 0,15 0,15 0,08
1989 0,16 0,16 0,09 0,13 0,15 0,09
1990 0,17 0,15 0,09 0,13 0,13 0,08
1991 0,21 0,19 0,09 0,15 0,15 0,09
1992 0,20 0,19 0,11 0,15 0,15 0,11
1993 0,20 0,19 0,10 0,15 0,15 0,09
1994 0,25 0,24 0,11 0,19 0,19 0,09
1995 0,23 0,22 0,11 0,15 0,15 0,10
1996 0,24 0,23 0,08 0,14 0,14 0,07
1997 0,26 0,25 0,09 0,16 0,16 0,08
1998 0,22 0,21 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,08
1999 0,21 0,20 0,10 0,03 0,03 0,09
2000 na na 0,05 na na 0,06
Ave.of 70's 0,21 0,17 na 0,22 na na
Ave.of 80's 0,18 0,17 0,09 0,13 0,13 0,08
Ave.of 90's 0,22 0,21 0,10 0,14 0,14 0,09
Note: Country coverages are not the same over time and across different indicators.
Table 5: Rankings of the Countries, when we exclude Social Security and Defence Expenditures (1972-2000)
Sorted by: EXPs&p/TOT EXPs&p/CURR EXPloc/CURR
Canada 0,65 Canada 0,63 Denmark 0,59
Switzerland 0,60 Switzerland 0,60 Sweden 0,55
Argentina 0,54 Argentina 0,52 Finland 0,53
Australia 0,50 Australia 0,50 Guatemala 0,52
United States 0,47 United States 0,46 Switzerland 0,49
Pakistan 0,38 Pakistan 0,41 Mongolia 0,48
Brazil 0,36 Korea, Rep. 0,35 Norway 0,45
Germany 0,34 Brazil 0,33 United States 0,42
Korea, Rep. 0,27 Germany 0,32 Canada 0,38
France 0,26 Colombia 0,29 Netherlands 0,35
Austria 0,26 Austria 0,26 United Kingdom 0,35
Colombia 0,25 Mexico 0,22 Italy 0,31
Bolivya 0,25 Spain 0,21 Ireland 0,29
Mexico 0,23 Bolivya 0,21 Austria 0,26
Spain 0,22 Malaysia 0,13 Germany 0,25
Malaysia 0,20 Belgium 0,00 Spain 0,24
South Africa 0,19 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 Luxembourg 0,24
Belgium 0,00 Zimbabwe 0,23
Burkina Faso 0,00 Average 0,32 Uruguay 0,22
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,00 France 0,22
Netherlands 0,00 Iceland 0,21
Sri Lanka 0,00 Israel 0,16
Thailand 0,00 Bolivya 0,16
Tunisia 0,00 Australia 0,16
Venezuela, RB 0,00 Belgium 0,15
Indonesia 0,14
Average 0,24 Brazil 0,14
Chile 0,14
Colombia 0,12
Thailand 0,09
South Africa 0,09
Nicaragua 0,08
Greece 0,06
Sri Lanka 0,06
Mauritius 0,06
Tunisia 0,06
Trinidad and Tobago 0,06
Dominican Republic 0,05
Mexico 0,05
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0,05
Paraguay 0,04
Malaysia 0,04
Gambia, The 0,03
Costa Rica 0,03
Panama 0,03
Ethiopia 0,02
Average 0,21
Note: Time coverages of countries are not uniform. 
EXPs&p/TOTEXPs&p/CURREXPloc/CURR REVs&p/TOTREVs&p/CURRREVloc/CURR
1972 0,49 0,45 na 0,18 na na
1973 0,55 0,48 na 0,20 na na
1974 0,49 0,43 na 0,23 na na
1975 0,48 0,43 na 0,23 na na
1976 0,47 0,41 na 0,23 na na
1977 0,47 0,42 na 0,24 na na
1978 0,47 0,42 na 0,24 na na
1979 0,47 0,46 na 0,24 na na
1980 0,40 0,40 0,35 0,23 0,23 0,17
1981 0,41 0,41 0,35 0,23 0,23 0,17
1982 0,40 0,42 0,36 0,23 0,23 0,17
1983 0,40 0,43 0,35 0,24 0,24 0,18
1984 0,39 0,41 0,34 0,24 0,24 0,18
1985 0,38 0,38 0,36 0,23 0,23 0,16
1986 0,37 0,37 0,32 0,20 0,20 0,16
1987 0,39 0,38 0,33 0,17 0,20 0,16
1988 0,39 0,38 0,33 0,24 0,24 0,17
1989 0,40 0,39 0,33 0,18 0,20 0,17
1990 0,49 0,49 0,37 0,24 0,24 0,16
1991 0,45 0,45 0,34 0,25 0,25 0,17
1992 0,44 0,43 0,33 0,25 0,25 0,18
1993 0,44 0,43 0,33 0,25 0,25 0,17
1994 0,44 0,43 0,32 0,25 0,25 0,17
1995 0,45 0,44 0,31 0,26 0,25 0,17
1996 0,45 0,44 0,31 0,25 0,25 0,17
1997 0,40 0,39 0,29 0,26 0,25 0,16
1998 0,36 0,35 0,31 0,25 0,24 0,19
1999 0,53 0,59 0,64 0,20 0,20 0,20
2000 na na 0,46 na na 0,34
Ave. of 70's 0,49 0,44 na 0,22 na na
Ave. of 80's 0,39 0,40 0,34 0,22 0,22 0,17
Ave. of 90's 0,45 0,44 0,36 0,25 0,24 0,18
Note: Country coverages are not the same over time and across different indicators.
Table 6:   Country Averages per year, Developed Country Sample Only, when we exclude Social 
Security and Defence Expenditures:
EXPs&p/TOTEXPs&p/CURREXPloc/CURR REVs&p/TOTREVs&p/CURRREVloc/CURR
1972 0,37 0,36 na 0,24 na na
1973 0,32 0,39 na 0,15 na na
1974 0,39 0,36 na 0,26 na na
1975 0,35 0,27 na 0,26 na na
1976 0,34 0,27 na 0,24 na na
1977 0,31 0,29 na 0,19 na na
1978 0,31 0,29 na 0,18 na na
1979 0,26 0,24 na 0,14 na na
1980 0,27 0,25 0,16 0,13 0,14 0,07
1981 0,28 0,29 0,15 0,14 0,15 0,07
1982 0,27 0,28 0,15 0,13 0,14 0,07
1983 0,28 0,29 0,12 0,13 0,15 0,08
1984 0,29 0,30 0,12 0,13 0,15 0,08
1985 0,35 0,34 0,18 0,11 0,11 0,08
1986 0,24 0,22 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,09
1987 0,22 0,19 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,08
1988 0,23 0,21 0,11 0,15 0,15 0,08
1989 0,23 0,21 0,11 0,13 0,15 0,09
1990 0,22 0,19 0,15 0,13 0,13 0,08
1991 0,25 0,23 0,17 0,15 0,15 0,09
1992 0,24 0,23 0,18 0,15 0,15 0,11
1993 0,25 0,24 0,18 0,15 0,15 0,09
1994 0,28 0,27 0,15 0,19 0,19 0,09
1995 0,27 0,26 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,10
1996 0,28 0,28 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,07
1997 0,31 0,31 0,14 0,16 0,16 0,08
1998 0,29 0,28 0,13 0,10 0,10 0,08
1999 0,23 0,23 0,12 0,03 0,03 0,09
2000 na na 0,05 na na 0,06
Ave.of 70's 0,33 0,31 na 0,22 na na
Ave.of 80's 0,27 0,26 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,08
Ave.of 90's 0,26 0,25 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,09
Note: Country coverages are not the same over time and across different indicators.
Table 7: Country Averages per year, Developing Country Sample Only, when we exclude Social 
Security and Defence Expenditures:
Table 8: Hausman Tests for Fixed versus Random Effects (Chi-square)
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Expenditure models (in Table 9): 56,99*** 33,41*** 5,58* 7,16** 4,08 8,29** 0,51 2,29 9,79***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.027) (0.130) (0.016) (0.774) (0.318) (0.007)
Revenue models (in Table 10): 5,75* 32,52*** 40,75*** 8,84** 8,17** 28,44*** 0,7 1,32 3,55
(0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.017) (0.000) (0.704) (0.518) (0.169)
Expenditure models (in Table 11): 44.32*** 35.76*** 11,33*** 5,22* 3,96 9,18** 0,49 2.12 10.04***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.063) (0.154) (0.012) (0.777) (0.396) (0.006)
Expenditure models (in Table 12): 5.57* 14.05*** 27.11*** 14.97*** 41.40*** 24.22*** 1.98 1.00 4.41*
(0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.370) (0.607) (0.094)
Revenue models (in Table 13): 6.35** 30.13*** 30.89*** 5.67* 8.90** 11.85*** 1.56 0.05 4.28
(0.041) (2.864) (0.000) (0.058) (0.011) (0.003) (0.457) (0.976) (0.117)
Expenditure models (in Table 14): 39.62*** 42.50*** 4.78* 6.58** 2.79 3.89 1.27 1.16 1.49
(0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.037) (0.247) (0.142) (0.528) (0.559) (0.475)
Expenditure models (in Table 15): 0.56 0.57 2.49 11.68*** 6.94** 5.79* 1.62 2.95 1.30
(0.755) (0.751) (0.288) (0.002) (0.031) (0.055) (0.444) (0.229) (0.522)
Revenue models (in Table 16): 6.92** 23.19*** 1.59 5.00* 8.07** 25.03*** 2.40 1.54 3.74
(0.031) 0.000 (0.450) (0.08) (0.018) (0.000) (0.300) (0.463) (0.153)
Note: Numbers in the parentheses are the p-values.
*** İndicates significance at 1% level , ** indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level.
D DEFGDP GDPGR
Table 9: Expenditure Based Fiscal Decentralization Indicators with Social Security and Defence Expenditures 
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant: -0,42 5.57*** 5.28***
(-0.77) (7.70) (7.38)
EXPs&p/TOT  -0.69***  -6.81** 3.63**
(-5.28) (-2.41) (2.33)
EXPt/GDP 0,16 25.55***  -5.21**
(1.03) (7.35) (-2.14)
EXPs&p/CURR  -1.30*** 0,64 4.79**
(-7.37) (0.46) (2.54)
EXPsp&cc/GDP 0.36** 17.70***  -7.34***
(1.99) (9.11) (-2.81)
EXPloc/CURR  -1.51***  -49.56*** -17,67
(-4.83) (-2.61) (-1.31)
EXPclc/GDP 0.92*** 93.94***  -12.43***
(8.51) (14.41) (-2.87)
DC*(EXPs&p/TOT) 0.61* -4,89  -5.29**
(1.87) (-0.67) (-2.22)
DC*(EXPt/GDP)  -0.54** -9,01 -1,17
(-2.08) (-1.55) (-0.58)
DC*(EXPs&pCURR) 1.09***  -7.86***  -6.46**
(2.64) (-3.72) (-2.29)
DC*(EXPsp&cc/GDP)  -0.75** -2,79 0,93
(-2.53) (-1.53) (0.38)
DC*(EXPloc/CURR) 1.62*** 34,49 7,55
(2.97) (1.03) (0.47)
DC*(EXPclc/GDP)  -1.27***  -42.90*** -8,59
(-6.38) (-3.57) (-1.50)
DD  -3.42***  -3.07***  -2.07***
(-6.06) (-5.20) (-4.14)
R-bar square 0,06 0,14 0,15 0,13 0,24 0,29 0,12 0,13 0,08
# of observations 431 359 668 416 341 656 429 354 658
F-test for decentralization 0.08 0.31 0.06 0.27 0.58 0.37 1.12 1.23 0.36
Notes:
2) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
3) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
1) Columns 1 to 3 indicate the use of different decentralization indicators: the share of state or provincial governments in total expenditures, the share of state or provincial governments' 
current expenditures in total current expenditures and the share of local governments' current expenditure in total current expenditures, respectively.    
Table 10: Revenue Based Fiscal Decentralization Indicators
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant: 4.33*** 3.41*** 3.81***
(6.08) (3.75) (8.42)
REVs&p/TOT  -0.38*** 7.47** 4.68***
(-2.92) (2.09) (2.62)
REVt/GDP  -0.51***  -18.43*** -0,54
(-2.61) (-3.37) (-0.19)
REVs&p/CURR  -0.63**  -15.34* 4.72**
(-2.03) (-1.76) (2.16)
REVsp&cc/GDP  -3.13***  -34.95*** 2,11
(-7.42) (-2.93) (0.57)
REVloc/CURR  -3.28***  -146.83***  -8.63***
(-8.63) (-6.14) (-3.56)
REVclc/GDP -0,16 17,40 3,11
(-0.80) (1.29) (1.60)
DC*(REVs&p/TOT) -0,11 2,07  -6.10**
(-0.21) (0.14) (-2.33)
DC*(REVt/GDP) -0,04 21.49*  -3.89*
(-0.09) (1.93) (-1.77)
DC*(REVs&pCURR) 0,05 24,32  -5.19*
(0.06) (1.08)  (-1.66)
DC*(REVsp&cc/GDP) 2.50*** 6,36  -4.85*
(3.28) (0.29) (-1.85)
DC*(REVloc/CURR) 3.51*** 187.95*** 5.54*
(6.04) (4.87) (1.69)
DC*(REVclc/GDP)  -0.61* -32,2  -4.76***
(-1.74) (-1.35) (-2.91)
DD  -3.55***  -3.56***  -3.03***
(-6.22) (-5.68) (-6.95)
R-bar square 0,06 0,18 0,10 0,02 0,04 0,06 0,11 0,11 0,09
# of observations 422 289 675 405 278 659 418 284 664
F-test for decentralization 0.98 0.66 0.26 0.49 0.16 9.43*** 1.69 0.23 0.71
Notes:
2) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
3) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
1) Columns 1 to 3 indicate the use of different decentralization indicators: the share of state or provincial governments in total revenues, the share of state or provincial 
governments' current revenues in total current revenues and the share of local governments' current revenues in total current revenues, respectively.    
Table 11: Expenditure Based Fiscal Decentralization Indicators without Social Security and Defence Expenditures
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant: 1.83*** 3.09***  3.06***
(3.09) (3.92) (3.87)
EXPs&p/TOT  -1.26***  -20.34*** 5.11***
(-7.25) (-4.58) (2.91)
EXPt/GDP 0,29 26.72*** 3,99
(1.35) (4.96) (1.11)
EXPs&p/CURR  -1.12***  -5.72*** 3.87**
(-7.48) (-4.33) (2.07)
EXPsp&cc/GDP 0.62** 22.72*** 4,78
(2.41) (7.52) (1.09)
EXPloc/CURR  -1.30*** 5,06  -24.18**
(-4.49) (0.23) (-2.41)
EXPclc/GDP 1.13*** 119.46***  -15.01***
(8.30) (11.74) (-3.22)
DC*(EXPs&p/TOT) 1.24*** 17.07**  -6.48***
(4.63) (2.54) (-2.74)
DC*(EXPt/GDP)  -0.76**  -13.94* -3,86
(-2.26) (-1.68) (-1.06)
DC*(EXPs&pCURR) 1.01*** -1,06  -6.20**
(3.50) (-0.57) (-2.36)
DC*(EXPsp&cc/GDP)  -1.09*** -4,95 -3,08
(-2.85) (1.43) (-0.61)
DC*(EXPloc/CURR) 1.56*** 34,31 -3,95
(4.03) (1.17) (-0.29)
DC*(EXPclc/GDP)  -1.29***  -45.84**  -17.92*
(-4.66) (2.18) (-1.87)
DD  -4.32***  -3.97***  -2.15***
(-5.89) (-4.97) (-5.48)
R-bar square 0,18 0,25 0,25 0,17 0,30 0,27 0,11 0,09 0,09
# of observations 306 248 515 296 236 509 306 246 511
F-test for decentralization 0.01 0.18 1.52 1.14 0.41 0.18 0.09 0.65 0.25
Notes:
2) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
3) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
1) Columns 1 to 3 indicate the use of different decentralization indicators: the share of state or provincial governments in total expenditures, the share of state or provincial 
governments' current expenditures in total current expenditures and the share of local governments' current expenditures in total current expenditures, respectively.    
Table 12: Expenditure Based Fiscal Decentralization Indicators with New Control Variables and  Social Security and Defence Expenditures
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant:  7.54***  4.81***
(5.85) (3.90)
EXPs&p/TOT  -0.79***  -12.24***   2.92  
(-5.38) (-4.82) (1.04)
EXPt/GDP 0.34*  39.76***  -10.25***
(1.79) (11.87) (-2.79)
VISPEXPT  -0.02  0.66  -0.71
(-0.36) (0.69) (-0.62)
EXPs&p/CURR  -1.49***  -28.46***  6.30*
(-5.84) (-7.72) (1.77)
EXPsp&cc/GDP  0.61**  26.68***  -5.72
(2.38) (7.21) (-1.41)
VISPEXPC  0.04  1.43*  -0.70
(0.86) (1.94) (-0.86)
EXPloc/CURR  -2.66***  -68.85***  -20.88 
(-7.32) (-2.74) (-1.61)
EXPclc/GDP  0.97***  86.67***  -12.13***
(9.04) (11.73) (-3.26)
VILOCEXPC  0.03  6.57***  0.41
(0.84) (2.78) (0.36)
DC*(EXPs&p/TOT)  0.61  -7.67  -4.18
(1.54) (-1.13) (-0.83)
DC*(EXPt/GDP)  -0.79***  -27.42***  1.76
(-2.61) (-5.20) (0.34)
DC*(VISPEXPT) 0.18  2.49  -2.38
(0.96) (0.72) (-0.79)
DC*(EXPs&pCURR)  1.33**  -4.83  -5.42
(2.12) (-0.53) (-0.85)
DC*(EXPsp&cc/GDP)  -1.13**  -3.07  -0.39
(-2.07) (0.38) (-0.06)
DC*(VISPEXPC)  0.08  -2.92  -0.27
(0.40) (-0.92) (-0.09)
DC*(EXPloc/CURR)  2.83***  55.64  8.10
(5.16) (1.48) (0.43)
DC*(EXPclc/GDP)  -1.26***  -32.79**  -11.08*
(-6.45) (-2.47) (-1.67)
DC*(VILOCEXPC)  -0.10  -9.82  1.80
(-1.13) (-1.63) (0.60)
DD  -3.32***  -3.20***  -2.73***
(-5.60) (-4.56) (-4.67)
R-bar square 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.56 0.60 0.48 0.33 0.28 0.25
# of observations 381 272 624 361 261 607 375 267 609
F-test for decentralization 0.22 0.07 0.17 10.01*** 16.07*** 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.85
Notes:
2) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
3) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
1) Columns 1 to 3 indicate the use of different decentralization indicators: the share of state or provincial governments in total expenditures, the share of state or provincial governments' current 
expenditures in total current expenditures and the share of local governments' current expenditures in total current expenditures, respectively.    
Table 13: Revenue Based Fiscal Decentralization Indicators with New Control Variables 
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant: 6.23*** 3.65** 4.33***
(4.71) (2.12) (5.10)
REVs&p/TOT  -0.46**   6.59  2.72
(-2.55) (1.34) (0.83)
REVt/GDP  -1.21***  -24.57***  -7.28
(-3.61) (-2.67) (-1.37)
VISPREVT  -0.01**  -0.08  0.06
(-2.44) (-0.89) (0.73)
REVs&p/CURR  -0.60*  -11.94  3.63
(-1.74) (-1.35) (0.86)
REVsp&cc/GDP  -3.66***  -45.80***  1.48
(-6.99) (-3.39) (0.22)
VISPREVC  -0.00  -0.04  0.07
(-0.82) (-0.37) (0.80)
REVloc/CURR  -2.79***  -101.33***  -11.70**
(-7.71) (-3.90) (-2.51)
REVclc/GDP  -0.19  5.61  2.61
(-0.94) (0.39) (0.74)
VILOCREVC 0.10*** 10.54***  -0.20
(4.69) (6.80) (-0.40)
DC*(REVs&p/TOT)  -0.06  -1.12  -2.69
(-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.43)
DC*(REVt/GDP)  0.63 19.19  -3.15
(1.20) (1.32) (-0.50)
DC*(VISPREVT)  0.00 0.00  -0.37
(0.16) (0.00) (-0.68)
DC*(REVs&pCURR)  -0.05  21.41  -2.44
(-0.06) (0.94) (-0.35)
DC*(REVsp&cc/GDP) 3.07*** 15.29  -5.62
(3.45) (0.66) (-0.88)
DC*(VISPREVC)  -0.00 0.29  -0.36
(-0.03) (0.30) (-0.54)
DC*(REVloc/CURR) 2.88*** 223.04***  10.07
(4.44) (4.80) (1.53)
DC*(REVclc/GDP)  -0.60*  -6.14  -6.35*
(-1.74) (-0.25) (-1.82)
DC*(VILOCREVC)  -0.11***  -5.69***  0.27
(-3.72) (-2.70) (0.45)
DD  -3.49***  -3.39***  -3.00***
(-5.95) (-4.88) (-5.83)
R-bar square 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.27 0.20
# of observations 382 273 629 362 262 608 376 268 613
F-test for decentralization 0.89 0.66 0.03 0.12 0.20 10.01*** 0.01 0.04 0.12
Notes:
2) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
3) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
1) Columns 1 to 3 indicate the use of different decentralization indicators: the share of state or provincial governments in total revenues, the share of state or provincial governments' current 
revenues in total current revenues and the share of local governments' current revenues in total current revenues, respectively.    
Table14: Expenditure Based Fiscal Decentralization Indicators with New Control Variables but without Social Security and Defence Expenditures
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant:  4.26***  1.28  5.71***  3.66**  5.85***
(2.73) (0.80) (3.19) (2.43) (3.13)
EXPs&p/TOT  -1.35***  -18.79***  3.50
(-6.49) (-5.16) (0.87)
EXPt/GDP  0.47  41.54***  -3.43
(1.62) (7.75) (-0.59)
VISPEXPT  0.17**  4.50***  -1.50
(2.05) (3.16) (-0.82)
EXPs&p/CURR  -1.39***  -17.48***  2.11
(-5.90) (-5.66) (0.66)
EXPsp&cc/GDP  0.85**  29.10***  3.73
(2.33) (5.81) (0.64)
VISPEXPC  0.09*  1.39  -0.79
(1.68) (1.63) (-0.76)
EXPloc/CURR  -1.21***  -24.68***  -10.09
(-3.62) (-3.26) (-1.02)
EXPclc/GDP  1.88***  36.26***  -4.97
(8.42) (6.98) (-0.73)
VILOCEXPC  0.13**  0.55  1.62
(2.61) (0.44) (1.12)
DC*(EXPs&p/TOT)  1.30***  7.54   -3.69
(3.75) (1.26) (-0.76)
DC*(EXPt/GDP)  -1.01**  -32.71***  -2.14
(-2.43) (-4.45) (-0.26)
DC*(VISPEXPT)  0.02  -1.26  -2.56
(0.11) (-0.34) (-0.68)
DC*(EXPs&pCURR)  1.40***  13.18***  -5.04
(2.80) (2.70) (-1.05)
DC*(EXPsp&cc/GDP)  -1.48**  -26.58***  -0.66
(-2.27) (-2.78) (-0.06)
DC*(VISPEXPC)  0.07  -1.09  -1.51
(0.30) (-0.34) (-0.47)
DC*(EXPloc/CURR)  1.16  65.39***  8.75
(0.81) (4.05) (0.44)
DC*(EXPclc/GDP)  -3.29***  -42.15***  -2.96
(-6.38) (-5.45) (-0.33)
DC*(VILOCEXPC)  0.02  -1.67  0.08
(0.06) (-0.45) (0.02)
DD  -4.06***  -3.89***  -3.14***
(-5.09) (-4.48) (-2.79)
R-bar square  0.71 0.73 0.84 0.60 0.54 0.53 0.35 0.21 0.12
# of observations 257 183 169 244 178 164 255 181 167
F-test for decentralization 0.04 0.00 0.00 5.62** 0.78 15.11*** 0.00 0.39 0.01
Notes:
2) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
3) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
1) Columns 1 to 3 indicate the use of different decentralization indicators: the share of state or provincial governments in total expenditures, the share of state or provincial governments' 
current expenditures in total current expenditures and the share of local governments' current expenditures in total current expenditures, respectively.    
Table 15: Expenditure Based Proxies of Vertical Imbalances
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant: 0.08 0.09 0.05 6.42*** 3.87*** 3.95***
(1.15) (1.10) (0.91) (5.02) (3.82) (3.10)
VISPEXPT  -0.04 2.04  -0.96
(-0.50) (1.43) (-0.56)
EXPt/GDP 1.05*** 50.69***  -3.22
(3.99) (9.41) (-0.58)
VISPEXPC  -0.10**  -1.23  -0.56
(-2.08) (-1.50) (-0.62)
EXPsp&cc/GDP 1.63*** 41.34*** 5.35
(5.10) (7.03) (0.98)
VILOCEXPC 0.14*** 0.96 1.17
(3.08) (0.58) (0.84)
EXPclc/GDP 1.93*** 43.87***  -2.00
(9.52) (7.43) (-0.31)
DC*(VISPEXPT) 0.23 0.67  -3.61
(1.26) (0.17) (-1.04)
DC*(EXPt/GDP)  -1.51***  -46.24***  -4.04
(-4.51) (-6.30) (-0.64)
DC*(VISPEXPC) 0.22 2.74  -1.05
(1.14) (0.70) (-0.41)
DC*(EXPsp&cc/GDP)  -2.04***  -44.97***  -8.85*
(-4.84) (-4.71) (-1.70)
DC*(VILOCEXPC)  -0.13  -9.12  -0.24
(-0.76) (-1.60)  (-0.06)
DC*(EXPclc/GDP)  -2.16***  -33.83***  -3.98
(-7.18) (-2.79) (-0.65)
DD  -4.27*** -3.91***  -2.80**
(-5.60) (-4.59) (-2.57)
R-bar square 0.64 0.67 0.81 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.35 0.20 0.11
# of observations 257 183 169 244 178 164 255 181 167
F-test for decentralization 1.27 0.45 0.00 0.58 0.15 2.24 2.15 0.46 0.06
Notes:
2) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
3) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
4) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
1) Columns 1 to 3 indicate the use of different proxies of vertical imbalances: the ratio of state provincial total deficit to total exp. of state provincial gov., the ratio of state 
provincial current deficit to current exp. of state provincial gov. and the ratio of local current deficit to current exp. of local gov., respectively.    
Mod. Table16:
Dependent Variable: D DEFGDP GDPGR
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Explanatory variables: 
Constant: 4.03*** 4.75*** 4.69*** 3.51***
(4.42) (4.55) (6.27) (4.50)
VISPREVT  -0.01*** -0.10 0.06
(-3.36) (-1.16) (0.87)
VITGDPREV  -3.40*** 5.36 7.17
(-5.89) (0.40) (0.64)
VISPREVC  -0.01**  -0.12 0.08
(-2.25) (-1.28) (0.97)
VISPCCREV (-7.33)***  -19.34 26.40
(-5.78) (-0.88) (1.65)
VILOCREVC 0.13*** 10.35***  -0.39
(6.59) (7.48) (-0.62)
VICLCREV  -4.04***  -138.50**  -73.70***
(-4.95) (-2.42) (-2.63)
DC*(VISPREVT) 0.00   -0.08  -0.70
(0.04) (-0.14) (-1.49)
DC*(VITGDPREV) 1.47  -14.14  -25.03**
(1.34) (0.95) (-2.11)
DC*(VISPREVC)  -0.00  -0.10  -0.61
(-0.06) (-0.14) (-1.10)
DC*(VISPCCREV) 5.24** 3.14  -34.59**
(2.45) (0.15) (-2.32)
DC*(VILOCREVC)  -0.15***  -6.66***  -0.49
(-5.50) (-3.45) (-0.57)
DC*(VICLCREV) 2.06 284.88*** 3.75
(1.62) (3.16) (0.09)
DD  -3.35***  -3.28***  -3.02***
(-5.74) (-4.87) (-5.47)
R-bar square 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.22 0.21 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.22
# of observations 385 275 637 362 263 614 378 269 619
F-test for decentralization 0.14 1.46 1.13 0.10 0.09 7.46*** 1.17 0.90 2.26
1) *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
2) The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
3) Variable descriptions can be found in the Appendix 1.
